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ABSTRACT 
Essays in Mergers and Acquisitions 
Wenjing Ouyang 
 
 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are one of the most important corporate investment 
decisions that are often strategic. During the decision making, managers and shareholders 
are exposed to all sorts of information sets regarding merger opportunities and deal 
evaluation. In this dissertation, I examine whether managers and shareholders use 
valuable information from financial advisors and the financial market and disregard 
potentially misleading information from financial advisors when making merger 
investment decisions. 
The first essay is titled “Do Shareholders Listen? M&A Advisor Opinions and 
Shareholder Voting. Recent studies find that merger advisors, in particular those of the 
acquirer, often face conflicts of interest and present overly optimistic opinions about a 
deal. It is not clear, however, how shareholders react to these opinions. Using a sample of 
mergers announced from 2000 to 2006, we examine whether target and acquirer advisors’ 
opinions (valuation of target equity, long-term earnings forecasts, and affiliated analyst 
recommendations) impact how acquirer shareholders vote on mergers. Our results 
indicate that target advisor opinions, but not those of acquirer advisors, significantly 
impact shareholder voting. Further, if a deal receives higher shareholder support, the 
merger advisor is more likely to be retained in future deals. Finally, acquirer advisor 
opinions are negatively related to post-merger performance. We conclude that 
shareholders are able to discern the potential conflict of interest of merger advisors and 
ix 
 
follow the advice of the less-optimistic target advisors. Our study provides important 
evidence for the ongoing debate about regulatory reform governing investment banking 
transactions. 
The second essay is titled “Stock Price Idiosyncratic Information and Merger 
Investment Decisions”. I define stock price idiosyncratic information (SPII) as investors’ 
firm-specific information impounded into stock price through informed trading. My study 
examines whether SPII provides managers the new information about the value of growth 
opportunities and improves merger investment decisions. Focusing on 2,018 major 
merger transactions announced during the period from 1990 to 2006, I find the acquirer 
SPII increases the sensitivity of merger investment to q. It is positively associated with 
acquirer announcement return, combined merger return, long-run abnormal return, and 
post-merger operating performance. Furthermore, these relations are mainly driven by 
acquirers with high q or blockholder ownership. My main results are robust to the 
endogeneity issue and the inclusion of manager’s private information. Overall, these 
results support my learning hypothesis. Further, management learning efficiency is 
positively related with firm growth opportunities, management quality, and corporate 
governance. My study provides important evidence that managers learn from the stock 
market in making merger investment decisions. 
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CHAPTER I: Do Shareholders Listen? 
 M&A Advisor Opinions and Shareholder Voting 
 
I. Introduction 
In merger transactions, acquirer and target firms frequently seek opinions from 
financial advisors. Kisgen, Qian, and Song (2009) document that 45% of acquirers and 
82% of targets obtain financial advisors’ opinions in 1,175 mergers from 1994-2003. In 
their letters to the boards and shareholders of the merging companies, financial advisors 
systematically conclude that the merger under consideration is fair to the merging firms. 
Prior studies, however, document that financial advisor fees are typically contingent upon 
deal completion (Kisgen et al. 2009; Davidoff, Makhija and Narayanan, 2007; Becher 
and Jeurgens, 2011). As a result, financial advisors have the incentive to provide opinions 
that increase the likelihood of deal completion rather than maximize shareholder wealth 
(McLaughlin, 1990; Rau, 2000; and Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008). This potential 
conflict of interest has attracted attention from regulators. In 2007, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) approved Rule 2290 that requires Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) member firms to fully disclose any potential conflict of 
interest in the process of reaching their fairness opinions presented to shareholders of 
public firms involved in acquisitions.  
Nevertheless, prior studies of stock market reaction to merger announcements 
document that mergers, on average, do not create wealth for acquirer shareholders 
(Travlos, 1987; Amihud, Lev, and Travlos, 1990; Moeller, Schinglemann, and Stulz, 
2005). For example, Moeller et al. (2005) detail that acquirer shareholders lost nearly 
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$216 billion in the 1990s. Kisgen et al. (2009) document that acquirer announcement 
returns are 2.3% lower when their advisors provide fairness opinions. Many mergers, 
however, require shareholder approval and shareholders can block a deal if the majority 
of them believe the merger is not in their best interest. Thus, whether acquirer 
shareholders can discern financial advisors’ opinions and vote on the merits of a merger 
has important consequences.  
In this study we examine whether advisor opinions influence shareholder voting on 
mergers. If shareholders can ascertain the value of a merger and vote on its merit, 
financial advisors’ biased opinions will have little impact on how shareholders vote. In 
this case, financial advisors’ potential conflict of interest has little consequence for 
shareholder wealth. On the contrary, if merger advisors’ opinions can substantially affect 
how shareholders reach their voting decision, these opinions could significantly impact 
shareholder wealth. In this case, additional regulations and/or disclosure may be 
warranted to help reduce conflict of interests. 
Based on the literature, we propose three hypotheses to examine the relation between 
advisors’ opinions and shareholder voting: passive listener, uninterested listener, and 
active listener hypotheses. The Passive Listener hypothesis postulates acquirer 
shareholders listen to advisor opinions regardless of potential conflicts of interest. This 
hypothesis predicts higher shareholder support for a deal when a financial advisor’s 
opinion is more favorable. The Uninterested Listener hypothesis, however, suggests 
acquirer shareholders do not listen to advisors and vote without considering their 
opinions. This hypothesis predicts no significant relation between shareholder voting and 
advisor’s opinion. Finally, the Active Listener hypothesis proposes that acquirer 
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shareholders are able to recognize the potential conflict of interest in acquirer advisors’ 
opinions. Previous studies, as well as our empirical evidence, suggest target advisors are 
more conservative and less optimistic about deal outcome.
1
 This hypothesis predicts that 
target advisor opinions are more likely to impact acquirer shareholders’ votes. 
The focus of our analyses is the acquirer shareholders’ approval rate, which is 
measured as the percent of shares held by outside shareholders that support a deal. To 
measure financial advisors’ opinions, we collect three sets of information. First, we 
collect financial advisors’ valuation on target firm equity. The scaled difference between 
the offer price and the midpoint of target equity valuation is a measure of whether a 
financial advisor believes the acquirer over- or under-pays for the target. Second, we 
measure financial advisors’ opinions with their long-term EPS forecasts for the combined 
firm. Blockholders and institutional investors likely focus on long-term profits, rather 
than short term gains or losses (Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993). As a result, acquirer shareholders may be more likely to vote for a deal if they 
perceive an increase in long-term EPS. Third, we examine affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations after a deal is announced. Affiliated analysts work for the same 
investment bank as the merger advisor. Their recommendations, therefore, may be 
motivated by deal completion (Becher and Juergens, 2011 and Kolasinski and Kothari, 
2008).  
Using hand-collected data of financial advisors’ opinions on 136 mergers announced 
from 2000 to 2006, we show that acquirer shareholders listen to target advisors but tend 
                                                            
1See, Kesner, Shapiro, Sharma (1994), Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani,Saunders (2004), and Cain and Denis 
(2011). 
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to discount acquirer advisors’ opinions. Acquirer shareholders’ approval rate increases 
3.9% when target advisors’ equity valuation increases one standard deviation and 
increases 6.8% when they provide EPS forecasts. This rate increases by 11.7% when 
target-affiliated analysts issue recommendations on the acquirer after a deal is announced. 
We, however, find no consistent evidence acquirer shareholder voting is related to their 
own advisor’s opinions. These results support the active listener hypothesisas acquirer 
shareholders appear more likely to respond to target advisor opinions.  
We also find that the acquirer advisors are more optimistic in their valuation of target 
equity and their affiliated analysts provide more optimistic recommendations when the 
market reacts negatively to an announcement. In addition, favorable acquirer advisor 
opinions are associated with poor post-merger long-run performance. These findings 
suggest that acquirer advisors provide over-optimistic opinions about mergers they 
advise. Target advisors and their affiliated analysts, on the other hand, do not appear to be 
overly optimistic. Finally, we examine whether shareholder support for a merger impacts 
the likelihood an advisor is retained in future deals. A one standard deviation increase in 
the shareholder voting ratio increases the probability of advisor retention for future deals 
by nearly 6%. This suggests a merger advisor’s perceived ability to garner shareholder 
support is highly valued.  
Overall, our results imply that acquirer shareholders are able to discern acquirer 
advisors’ overly optimistic opinions and appear to follow target advisors’ relatively 
conservative opinions. Our paper contributes to the discussion about financial advisors’ 
conflict of interests on shareholder wealth as well as provides evidence on the efficacy of 
5 
 
shareholder voting.
2
 The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section I 
discusses related literatures and develops hypotheses. Section II describes the data and 
main variables. Section III presents our main empirical results while Section IV details 
additional tests. Section V concludes.  
 
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
This paper is related to two streams of literature: financial advisors’ role in mergers 
and acquisitions as well as shareholder voting on corporate decisions. The discussion 
about financial advisors’ role focuses on the benefits and potential conflict of interests of 
their advisory services. The debate on shareholder voting centers on how shareholders 
vote and the efficacy of their votes. In this section, we review these studies and propose 
three hypotheses. 
A. Financial Advisors’ Opinions 
Financial advisors possess certain expertise that may reduce information asymmetry 
in financial transactions (Bowers and Miller, 1990). Servaes and Zenner (1996) note that 
acquirers are more likely to hire financial advisors when deals are more complex and 
information on targets is less available.Kisgen et al. (2009) find the presence of a fairness 
opinion is positively related to deal complexity as well as board monitoring; suggesting 
                                                            
2Studies on acquirer shareholder voting find it is significantly related with deal characteristics, indicating 
that acquirer shareholder voting has a monitoring effect (Hamermesh, 2003 and Hsieh and Wang, 2008). 
Our results provide further evidence this monitoring effect is robust to the presence of financial advisors’ 
biased opinions. 
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fairness opinions provide valuable information to management and shareholders as well 
as legal protection to managers and boards of directors.  
The reputation of the financial advisors appears to benefit the shareholders. Bowers 
and Miller (1990) detail that total combined returns are higher when either party (target 
or bidder) hires a top-tier investment bank.
3
 Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) document that 
shareholders gain a higher portion of merger synergies when their financial advisors have 
higher reputation relative to the counter party.
4
Bao and Edmans (2011) find that stock 
returns from an investment bank’s prior deal predict returns on future deals advised by 
the same investment bank. 
While financial advisors may create value, conflicts of interests may explain why 
studies document non-positive acquirer returns in mergers. McLaughlin (1990, 1992) 
argue that contingent fee payments may lead to conflicts of interest. Rau (2000) finds that 
a higher proportion of top tier investment banks’ advisory fees are contingent and that 
acquirers advised by these advisors are more likely to complete a deal, but pay higher 
premiums. Further, financial advisors’ conflict of interest may affect their affiliated 
analysts’ recommendations. Becher and Juergens (2011) provide evidence that advisors’ 
affiliated analysts undertake actions to ensure deal completion. Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2008) detail that analysts affiliated with advisors provide biased recommendations to 
maximize financial advisors’ expected revenue. Collectively, this evidence suggests 
                                                            
3Bowers and Miller (1990) define first-tier bankers as those listed directly below the manager and co-
manager in the tombstones placed in the financial section of newspapers. 
4The authors define reputation as financial advisors’ investment banking market shares in the year of a 
merger.  
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financial advisors may face conflicts and provide opinions that maximize their own 
benefit at a cost to shareholders.  
Acquirers, targets and financial advisors may all have different interests in mergers. 
Specifically, acquirers want to pay a lower acquisition price, while targets want the 
opposite. Kesner, Shapiro, and Sharma (1994) document that the positive relation 
between financial advisors’ compensation and merger premium aligns interests between 
target shareholders and their financial advisors, but creates a conflict of interest between 
acquirer shareholders and their advisors. Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, and Saunders (2004) 
find that target advisors with a prior lending relation to the target serve a certification 
effect while acquirer advisors do not have such effect.  
This dichotomy stems from the fact acquirer advisors tend to provide opinions 
designed to garner future loan commitments from their clients while the target advisor’s 
client ceases to exist after the deal is completed. Cain and Denis (2011) examine financial 
advisors’ valuation of the target and find that only acquirer advisors issue 
optimisticopinions. Using their methodology, we find similar results (untabulated). 
Further, we examine the choice of financial advisor using a sample of combined firms 
that engage in another deal within three years of the sample deal. In these future deals, 
these firms are nearly four times more likely to hire the current acquirer advisors than 
target advisors. Taken together, these studies suggest target advisors may have less 
incentive to provide over-optimistic opinions.  
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B. Shareholder Voting in Corporate Decisions 
Mergers often require shareholder approval. Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) and 
Harris and Raviv (1988) argue that shareholder voting has limited efficacy due to free-
rider and agency problems. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) find mutual funds that own 
both target and acquirer stocks are more likely to vote for a merger at an acquirer 
shareholder meeting, even though the deal reduces acquirer shareholder value. Bethel and 
Gillan (2002) find managers tend to classify proposals as routine, rather than non-routine, 
to validate brokers’ uninstructed votes for a better outcome. Finally, the evidence that 
shareholder votes have little impact on future performance suggests shareholder voting 
may have limited efficacy (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 
1996). 
Other studies, however, detail that some shareholders cast votes based on 
performance, providing a potential threat to management. Cai, Garner, and Walkling 
(2009) and Gordon and Pound (1993) document a statistically significant relation 
between shareholder voting and prior firm performance. Thomas and Martin (2000) 
examine voting on stock option plans and show that shareholders are more likely to 
support such plans at poorly performing firms. They conclude shareholders’ voting may 
help to align managers’ interests. Martin and Thomas (2005) note that changes in 
compensation are significantly lower if shareholders strongly oppose management-
sponsored stock option plans, suggesting boards react to shareholders’ voting outcomes. 
Moreover, significant shareholder opposition in voting outcomes often leads to 
governance and management reforms (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989; Dodd and 
Warner, 1983; Mulherin and Poulsen, 1998; and Cai, et al., 2009).  
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Overall, the evidence from these studies suggests that shareholder voting can be an 
effective mechanism to protect shareholders’ interests in major corporate events. In this 
study, therefore, we examine whether financial advisors can affect shareholder voting 
decisions in mergers.  
C. Hypotheses 
We develop three hypotheses to examine whether acquirer shareholder voting 
behavior is impacted by target or acquirer financial advisors’ opinions. First, the Passive 
Listener hypothesis states that acquirer shareholders rely on financial advisors’ opinions 
in their voting decisions. This hypothesis postulates that acquirer shareholders listen to 
their advisors regardless of potential conflicts of interest. Financial advisors may have 
expertise in identifying merger partners with higher potential synergy as well as valuing 
merger gains. Bowers and Miller (1990) find the choice of financial advisors affects 
combined target and acquirer returns. Bao and Edmans (2011) show persistent acquirer 
announcement returns among different deals advised by the same bank and conclude that 
investment bank skills affect their clients’ shareholder wealth. Kisgen et al. (2009) and 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) document the probability of hiring a financial advisor 
increases with deal complexity and when the potential legal risk from conflicts of interest 
between the board and shareholders is highest. As a result, shareholders may be unable to 
recognize the bias in advisor opinions and rely on these opinions in their voting 
decisions. This hypothesis predicts a positive relation between financial advisor’s opinion 
on a merger and shareholder support for this deal.  
10 
 
Next, the Uninterested Listener hypothesis centers on the notion that acquirer 
shareholders recognize their financial advisors face potential conflicts of interest. In 
particular, shareholders are aware financial advisors provide opinions geared to deal 
completion rather than wealth maximization. McLaughlin (1990, 1992) argues a 
contingent advisory fee structure may trigger financial advisors’ conflicts of interest for 
deal completion regardless of quality. In addition, financial advisors may take advantage 
of their position to the detriment of current shareholders (Bodnaruk, Massa, and 
Simonov, 2009). Financial advisors’ affiliated analysts may also issue over optimistic 
recommendations to ensure maximum fee revenue (Becher and Juergens, 2011; 
Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008). Due to these potential conflicts of interest, acquirer 
shareholders may deem all financial advisors’ opinions biased and not take any advisor’s 
opinion into consideration when evaluating mergers. 
Finally, the Active Listener hypothesis proposes that acquirer shareholders may be 
able to recognize when financial advisors issue over-optimistic opinions and only react to 
more conservative opinions. Several studies document that acquirer financial advisors’ 
contingent fee payments and future business opportunities lead to conflicts of interest 
and, consequently, over-optimistic opinions. Prior studies document, however, that target 
advisors face less severe conflicts of interest and their opinions may be more 
conservative. The target firm ceases to exist after a merger, and as a result, the target 
advisor is less likely to obtain future business, which may reduce her incentive to provide 
over-optimistic opinions (Davidoff, 2006).  
In contrast, acquirer advisors have an incentive to form good relationship with 
acquirer managers for future business opportunities. To this end, these acquirer advisors 
11 
 
likely present over-optimistic opinions to help management close a deal.
5
 To convince 
target management and board to accept an offer, target advisors have an incentive to 
provide a lower target valuation and more conservative forecasts. Although such lower 
valuation may hurt target shareholders with reduced premium, the acquirer shareholders 
may find such conservative opinions valuable since these opinions may represent a 
conservative estimation of the target value and merger outcome. This hypothesis predicts, 
therefore, acquirer shareholders are more likely to listen to the target advisors’ opinions.  
 
III. Data and Sample Selection 
A. Sample Selection 
We start with all mergers announced between 2000 and 2006 on the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) Mergers & Acquisition database.
6
 Since we focus on acquirer 
shareholder voting, the acquirer must be a U.S. public firm, while the target may be 
public, private, or a foreign. Next, we obtain shareholder voting data from Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), SEC 8-k filings, or Factiva News search. These data 
requirements yield a sample of 153 mergers between 2000 and 2006. We collect financial 
advisors’ opinions from the proxy statement related to the merger (form S-4 and various 
proxy filings). Appendix B illustrates an example of financial advisor opinions provided 
in proxy statements. Among the 153 mergers, both the target and acquirer firm hire at 
                                                            
5Acquirer managers often gain from completing deals despite shareholder losses. Grinstein and Hribar 
(2004) find acquirer managers receive a substantial merger bonus even if shareholders lose value in a deal.  
6 Our sample ends in 2006 as we require three years of post-merger data to examine the future business 
relation between financial advisors and the merged firms. Further, the number of stock deals decrease 
considerable in 2008 and 2009 and there was a substantial increase in distressed or forced deals. 
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least one advisor in 136 cases. These 136 deals announced between 2000 and 2006 
represent our final sample. 
The major U.S. exchanges all require shareholder approval if a firm issues over 20% 
of outstanding shares in a merger.
7
 This requirement results in a sample of relatively 
large target firms. Table I details that the average transaction value-to-acquirer size ratio 
is 0.80.
8
 Stock price data are obtained from CRSP and augmented with data from Yahoo 
Finance (for targets not available on CRSP). All accounting data are collected from 
COMPUSTAT. 
B. Voting Measures 
Our main dependent variable is acquirer shareholder approval rate for merger 
proposals, which measures outside shareholders’ support. We exclude managerial and 
board ownership and shares held by financial advisors as we expect these parties always 
vote for a deal given our sample contains only friendly mergers.
9
 When a firm has 
multiple classes of outstanding shares that have differential voting power, we adjust the 
number of shares by the voting power of each class. Our acquirer shareholders’ approval 
rate, therefore, reflects the outside shareholders’ assessment of the deal. 
Burch et al. (2004) indicate that shareholders not in favor of a deal often vote 
“abstain” or do not cast a vote. If the beneficiary owner does not vote, her shares are 
                                                            
7NYSE Company Manual section 312.03, AMEX Company Guide section 712, and NASDAQ Marketplace 
Rules section 4350. 
8Burch et al. (2004) find average target-to-acquirer size of 0.55 for a 1990-2000 sample while Hsieh and 
Wang (2008) report average relative size of 0.76 for all stock deals and 1.19 for mixed-payment deals 
(1990 to 2005). 
9Target advisors’ incentives may be different in hostile deals. Since our sample does not include hostile 
deals, the opinion of advisors in hostile deals is beyond the scope of this study. 
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recorded as broker non-votes if these shares held under street name. We, therefore, use 
the total number of voting shares held by outside investors, rather than votes cast, as the 
base for the acquirer shareholder approval rate. This measure focuses on outside 
shareholder support for a deal rather than voting outcome.  
 
acquirer 
shareholder 
approval rate 
= 
shares voted for - shares held by managers and financial advisors 
(1) 
shares outstanding - shares held by managers and financial advisors 
 
Table I details that management and board on average own 11.2% of acquirer firm's 
outstanding voting rights while affiliated institutions own just over 1% voting rights. 
After excluding these insider votes, on average 63.2% shares held by outside 
shareholders support these deals. 
C. Financial Advisors’ Opinions 
Financial advisors’ opinions are detailed in the “Opinion of financial advisors” 
section in the joint proxy statement target and acquirer firms provide to their shareholders 
for approval. Specifically, we collect target firm equity valuation (“discounted cash flow 
analysis” section) and combined firm EPS forecasts (“pro-forma earnings analysis” 
section) from this document. Financial advisors’ affiliated analyst recommendations, 
however, are not included in this statement. We obtain these data from I/B/E/S and First 
Call.  
14 
 
C.1. Target Firm Equity Valuation 
In the proxy statement, financial advisors often provide an estimation of target firms’ 
equity value, usually in a valuation range. The offer price relative to the valuation range 
may indicate whether the acquirer is overpaying. Following Cain and Denis (2011), we 
define an equity valuation (EV) ratio based on the target’s relative selling price: 
 
EV ratio = 
average target equity valuation - offer price 
 (2) 
offer price 
     
A positive EV ratio indicates that the estimated target firm value is higher than the 
offer price, or that the acquirer underpays the target, while a negative EV ratio indicates 
overpayment.  
Table I details that, on average, acquirer advisors value the target equity 3% above 
the offer price, while the target advisors value the target equity 7% below offer price. The 
mean and median differences between acquirer and target advisors’ EV ratios are 9% and 
10%, respectively, and both of these differences have a p-value of 0.01. This evidence 
demonstrates that acquirer advisors are relatively more optimistic in target firm valuation.  
C.2. Advisors’ EPS Forecasts 
Merger advisors’ earnings accretion/dilution forecasts usually cover a period starting 
from deal completion to several years post-merger. In the first few years after a merger, 
combined firm earnings often include one-time merger charges and integration costs. The 
value of such earnings forecasts in long-term valuation is questionable. Management and 
their financial advisors, however, often suggest the earnings forecast in the last year of 
15 
 
the period can be extrapolated into later years. Thus, in our analysis, we focus on the 
financial advisors’ earnings forecast for the last year of the forecast period.  
EPS forecasts can be based on GAAP, cash, or book value EPS, and with different 
synergy scenarios. Even when advisors provide the same type of forecast, the forecast 
horizon may be different. For consistency, we collect target and acquirer advisors' EPS 
forecasts based on the same criteria whenever possible. If target and acquirer advisors use 
different EPS criteria, we select the GAAP EPS forecasts with the highest synergy or 
other most optimistic forecasts.
10
 
EPS forecasts are often descriptive, such as accretive, neutral, or dilutive. In our 
sample, descriptive EPS projections are available from acquirer advisors in 98 cases, 78 
cases from the target advisors, and 68 cases from both advisors. In some occasions, 
merger advisors also provide specific numbers of EPS forecasts. In our sample, however, 
numerical EPS projections are available only in 19 cases from both advisors. As a result, 
we measure EPS forecasts with three categories: accretion, neutral, and dilution. Table I 
reflects that in the majority of cases, advisors predict accretive EPS for the acquirer after 
the merger. Financial advisors often provide a range of EPS forecasts under different 
scenarios of merger synergies. Table I details that acquirer (target) advisors provide non-
dilutive EPS forecasts in 88 (71) deals, provide at least one dilutive EPS forecasts in 10 
(7) deals, and do not provide EPS forecasts in 38 (58) deals. Compared with acquirer 
                                                            
10  We collect GAAP EPS forecasts with synergy by acquirer (target) advisors in 58 (36) deals. EPS 
forecasts are acquirer advisors’ most optimistic forecasts in 87 cases (89%) and 65 cases (83%) for targets. 
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advisors, target advisors are less likely to provide EPS forecasts and when they do, the 
forecasts are less likely to be positive.
11
 
C.3. Affiliated Analysts’ Recommendations 
We define an analyst as affiliated if she works for the same investment bank as the 
financial advisors. From I/B/E/S and First Call, we obtain analyst recommendations for 
each acquirer firm during a period from three years before the merger announcement to 
the shareholder voting date. Recommendations have five levels, ranging from “1” for 
strong buy to “5” for sell. We compare analyst recommendation before merger 
announcements to those afterwards. In cases where an affiliated analyst does not issue a 
recommendation after the merger announcement but provides an earnings forecast, we 
assume she does not change her recommendation and use the most recent pre-
announcement recommendation. Following Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) and Becher 
and Juergens (2011), we classify analysts’ affiliations into three groups: acquirer-
affiliated, target-affiliated, and unaffiliated by manually matching analyst employers to 
financial advisors. 
Table I shows acquirer affiliated analysts provide significantly more favorable 
recommendations after merger announcements than unaffiliated analysts, but this does 
not appear to consistently hold for target affiliated analysts (mean is marginally 
significant, but no difference in medians). Among the 79 acquirer advisors’ affiliated 
analysts that cover an acquirer pre-merger, 14 drop coverage after the announcement. 
Similarly, among the 54 target advisors’ affiliated analysts who cover an acquirer pre-
                                                            
11Target advisors may be less likely to provide EPS forecasts because they have no obligation to provide 
EPS for acquirer shareholders since they are hired by target companies. 
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merger, 8 stop coverage post-announcement. Since their affiliated investment banks serve 
as financial advisors, these analysts may choose to keep quiet rather than give pessimistic 
recommendations. Thus, their silence may signal poor prospects for the merger.  
D. Other Firm and Deal Characteristics 
Panel C of Table I details firm and deal characteristics for our sample of 136 mergers 
in our voting regression analyses. The average acquirer firm has a market capitalization 
of $4.6 billion while the average target is valued $2.3 billion. Targets in our sample are 
relatively large compared to the acquirers since acquirer shareholder voting is only 
required if more than 20% of acquirer stock is issued to pay for a merger. As a result, 
nearly 60% of the mergers in our sample are paid entirely with stock.
12
 Next, target and 
acquirer firms are in the same industry in 74% of our sample deals. Such deals may be 
likely to have more synergies (e.g., better ability to decrease redundancies). 
Similar to other studies, we find that, on average, acquirers suffer a negative market 
reaction at deal announcement, with an average abnormal return of -2.1% over days [-20, 
+1]. This variable is implemented as a measure of deal quality. Matvos and Ostrovsky 
(2008) find mutual funds that own both target and acquirer stocks are more likely to vote 
for a deal at an acquirer shareholder meeting. We calculate combined returns from the 
acquirer and target stocks for institutions that hold both target and acquirer stocks. The 
average combined returns from cross-holdings is 1.36%. On average, acquirers hold 1.7% 
                                                            
12Shareholder voting may be endogenous. If an acquirer manager is not confident of shareholder support, 
she may pay with cash to avoid a vote. Our focus, however, is how shareholders respond to advisor 
opinions rather than how shareholder voting impacts deal completion. Nevertheless, we control for relative 
size and stock payment in our regressions. See Hsieh and Wang (2008)for an analysis of shareholder voting 
on merger completion.  
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of target stock before deal announcements (toehold). These toeholds may impact how 
synergies are divided between the target and the acquirer. All variable definitions are 
detailed in Appendix A. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
In this section, we examine the relation between acquirer shareholder voting and 
financial advisors’ opinions. As noted, acquirer financial advisors and their affiliated 
analysts tend to provide optimistic opinions on mergers they advise. When advisors 
choose not to express their opinions, the absence of a positive opinion may send a 
negative signal. We, therefore, examine both the presence of a financial advisor opinion 
about a merger as well as the specific context of such opinions.
13
 
A. Acquirer Shareholder Voting and Financial Advisors’ Valuation of Target Firm 
Equity 
We first examine whether the financial advisors’ valuation of the target firm equity 
impacts how outside acquirer shareholders vote. Such valuation is routinely presented in 
the merger proxy statement and signals whether an advisor believes the acquirer over- or 
under-pays for the target. Panel A in Table II details that when the target firm advisor 
provides an estimation of the target equity value, the average and median increase in 
acquirer shareholder support for the merger equals 5.6% and 8.2%, respectively. The two 
                                                            
13 Financial advisors do not appear to have policies regarding whether to provide an equity valuation 
opinion or a long-term earnings forecast. If an investment bank does have such policy, we would expect a 
discernable pattern in cases where it is involved in multiple deals. In our sample, 18 banks advised more 
than five deals. In all 18 cases, the bank provides valuations or earnings forecasts in some deals but not in 
others. No discernable factor explains the decision to provide these values.  
19 
 
figures have p-values of 0.02 and 0.01, respectively. When the acquirer firm advisor 
provides such estimation, however, the corresponding figures equal 2.6% and 0.4% and 
p-values are 0.24 and 0.30, respectively. The presence of a target advisors’ opinion 
appears to have a stronger effect on shareholder voting than that of an acquirer advisor.  
We next examine whether advisors’ specific opinions affect shareholder voting. 
Panel B of Table II indicates that when the offer price falls in the lower half of target 
advisor's equity valuation range, i.e. the offer price is below the mid-point of the 
valuation range, the mean and median acquirer shareholder support for the merger 
increases by 8.0% and 8.5%, respectively (both have p-value of 0.05). In contrast, when 
the acquirer advisor presents such equity valuation, mean and median shareholder support 
increases by only 1.9% and 3.6%, respectively, and both figures are statistically 
insignificant. This evidence suggests acquirer shareholders regard the target advisor’s 
valuation more than that of their own advisors. In addition, we find target advisors are 
more conservative in their valuation. In the 67 mergers where both advisors provide 
valuation figures, target advisors opine that the offer undervalues the target in 12 cases 
(18%) while acquirer advisor do so in 29 cases (43%).  
We next present multivariate results in Table III, where the dependent variable is the 
acquirer shareholder approval rate.
14
 Acquirer announcement returns, industry-adjusted 
ROA, relative deal size, stock payment dummy, cross-holding returns, toeholds, and 
same industry indicator are included as controls. In Model (1) the main independent 
variable is whether an advisor provides an opinion on the equity value of the target. 
                                                            
14  Since the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one, we use a Tobit model in all 
specifications. 
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When the target advisor provides an estimation of target firm equity value, acquirer 
shareholder support for a deal increases by 4.6% (p-value 0.05). The presence of an 
acquirer advisor opinion on valuation, however, has no statistically significant impact on 
shareholder voting.  
In Model (2) of Table III, we include only those cases where both the acquirer and 
target advisors provide a specific valuation of the target. The main independent variable 
in this model is the EV ratio. The results demonstrate that the acquirer shareholders’ 
approval rate increases 3.9% (=18.85%×20.9%) when the target advisor’s valuation 
increases by one standard deviation. The acquirer advisor’s specific opinion on target 
valuation, however, indicates no significant impact on shareholder voting.  
Finally, in Model (3), we classify advisor opinions into three categories: no opinion 
on valuation, equity valuation mid-point below offer price, and equity valuation mid-
point above offer price, and assign each category a value of -1, 0, and 1, respectively. We 
then use this categorical variable as the main independent variable in Model (3). We 
again find that the target advisor opinion has a significant effect on how acquirer 
shareholders vote (p-value of 0.02), while the acquirer advisor opinion has no significant 
effect on shareholder voting. These results provide consistent evidence that acquirer 
shareholders listen to target advisors’ opinions rather than those of their own advisors. 
B. Acquirer Shareholder Voting and Advisors’ EPS Forecasts 
Financial advisors often forecast the accretion or dilution effect of a merger on 
acquirer firm earnings in the proxy statement of a merger. These earnings forecasts, in 
particular the last figure in the forecast window that is often projected into the infinite 
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future, may signal a merger’s long-term effect on firm performance. In this section, we 
examine whether these earnings forecasts by financial advisors affect acquirer 
shareholder voting on the merger.  
Panel A in Table IV details that the acquirer shareholders’ approval rate increases by 
an average of 6.3% when the target advisor provides earnings forecasts (p-value of 0.01). 
The median increase is 9.2%, also statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the 
shareholder approval rate increases by an average of 1.2% and a median of 3.7% when 
the acquirer advisor provides earnings forecasts, and both figures are statistically 
insignificant. We next divide the sample by whether the advisors present non-dilutive 
earnings forecasts. Panel B shows the average (median) shareholder approval rate 
increases by 4.5% (7.3%) if target advisors predict a deal will be non-dilutive to acquirer 
earnings (p-values of 0.04 and 0.03, respectively). The approval rate, however, increases 
only 0.1% (mean or median) if acquirer advisors predict a non-dilutive EPS, and neither 
is statistically significant.  
These advisor earnings forecasts, however, may be correlated with the quality of a 
merger, which may independently impact shareholders’ voting. To control for this 
possible confounding factor, we estimate multivariate regressions of shareholder voting 
in Table V. The dependent variable is the acquirer shareholder approval rate and the main 
independent variables are whether financial advisors provide EPS forecasts and whether 
they forecast earnings dilution. We include the same control variables as in Table III 
except for industry-adjusted ROA because ROA is closely related to earnings.  
Results from Model (1) of Table V indicate that the acquirer shareholder approval 
rate increases by 6.8% when target advisors provide earnings forecasts (p-value below 
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0.01). In contrast, whether acquirer advisor provide forecasts has no significant effect on 
how shareholders vote. Model (2) shows that acquirer shareholder support for a merger 
increases by 5.1% when target advisors forecast non-dilutive earnings (p-value of 0.02). 
Acquirer advisors’ earnings forecasts, however, again show no effect on shareholder 
voting. Next, we rank earnings forecasts: no forecast, dilutive forecasts, and non-dilutive 
forecasts. This categorical variable is the main independent variable in model (3) where 
results suggest again that target advisor opinions have a significant and positive effect on 
acquirer shareholder voting, but acquirer advisor opinions do not. In fact, the coefficient 
of acquirer advisor opinions is negative, though not significant, in all three models.  
C. Acquirer Shareholder Voting and Affiliated Analysts’ Recommendations 
Next, we examine merger advisor opinions expressed via their affiliated analyst 
recommendation. A number of studies propose that changes in analyst recommendations 
are more informative. For example, Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) find that 
changes in recommendations, rather than levels, have predictive power for returns while 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) suggest analyst recommendation changes convey more 
information than levels. Further, Becher and Juergens (2011) note that the 2002 Global 
Research Analyst Settlement led to rescaling of recommendation levels and focus on 
changes in recommendations to avoid optimism in results. Thus, we examine how 
acquirer shareholder voting is related to affiliated analysts’ recommendation issuance, 
changes, and terminations. In this analysis, we focus on a sub-sample of 43 deals where 
both the target and acquirer advisors provide recommendations on the acquirer firm prior 
to the merger announcement.  
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Panel A in Table VI examines the certification effect of affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations. In most cases, target and acquirer advisors continue to provide 
recommendation for the acquirer after the merger announcement. The mean (median) 
acquirer shareholders’ approval rate on these deals is 10.6% (3.6%) higher than on deals 
where target affiliated analysts stop providing recommendations. These differences are 
statistically significant (both mean and median differences have p-values of 0.03) despite 
the small sample size. In contrast, whether or not the acquirer advisors continue to 
provide stock recommendation to acquirer stock has no significant effect on shareholder 
voting.  
In Panel B, we categorize recommendation changes into two groups: (1) initiated, 
upgraded and maintained same recommendations and (2) recommendation downgrades 
and instances when analysts stop providing recommendations after the deal is announced. 
The results are similar to those from Panel A. When target advisors' affiliated analysts 
improve their recommendations, the mean and median acquirer shareholders’ approval 
rate are 8.6% and 8.2% higher, respectively (p-value of 0.06 and 0.05). Acquirer analyst 
recommendations do not, however, appear to impact shareholder voting (though p-value 
of median is marginally significant at the 10% level). Collectively, these results suggest 
acquirer shareholders are less likely to listen to their own analysts, but appear to alter 
their voting behavior based on the recommendations of the target affiliated advisors.  
We next examine the relation between shareholder voting and affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations in a multivariate setting. Due to the small sample size, we include three 
controls: relative size, acquirer abnormal announcement return, and acquirer institutional 
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cross-holding returns.
15
 In model 1 of Table VII the independent variable is whether 
merger advisors provide post-announcement recommendations. Results highlight that 
acquirer shareholder approval rates increase 11.7% when target affiliated analysts 
provide post-announcement recommendations on acquirers (p-value below 0.01). In 
contrast, the presence of an acquirer-affiliated analyst recommendation appears to have 
no significant effect on how shareholders vote. Similarly, Model (2) suggests that when 
target analysts improve their recommendations on an acquirer stock, acquirer shareholder 
voting increases by 9.5% (p-value of 0.02). In contrast, acquirer analyst 
recommendations continue to have no significant impact.  
In Model (3), we segment affiliated analysts’ post-announcement recommendations 
into five categories: one for new recommendations, two for upgrades, three for 
maintaining the same recommendations, four for downgrades, and five if analysts stop 
providing recommendations post-announcement. Acquirer shareholders’ approval rate 
increases 4.2% when the category of target-affiliated analysts’ recommendations 
increases one level after the merger announcement (p-value of 0.02). This result suggests 
that shareholders are more likely to vote for a deal when target-affiliated analysts view a 
deal favorably. In contrast, acquirer affiliated analyst recommendations have no 
significant effect on shareholder voting. These results are consistent with findings from 
univariate tests suggesting target-affiliated analysts’ recommendations certify deal 
quality.  
                                                            
15 Including other controls produce similar results.In additional unreported specifications, we control for 
target (acquirer) advisor’s reputation, number of advisors, and advisor’s prior business relation with the 
firm in all model specifications in Tables 3, 5, and 7.Results remain qualitatively the same with these 
controls included. 
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V. Additional Tests 
A. Acquirer Announcement Returns and Advisors’ Opinions 
Prior studies as well as our results suggest that acquirer advisors are overly optimistic 
in their opinions to promote deal completion. To further investigate this result, we 
examine acquirer affiliated advisor recommendations conditional on the market reaction 
at the deal announcement. We expect these affiliated analysts to behave differently 
depending on the market reaction. Specifically, if the initial market reaction to a deal is 
negative, there is a greater chance the deal will fall apart (compared to a positive 
response). In this case, we predict that affiliated acquirer analysts should provide more 
positive recommendations to increase the probability of deal completion.  
In untabulated tests, we document that acquirer-affiliated analysts’ recommendations 
post-announcement are significantly more optimistic than those from unaffiliated analysts 
in deals where the acquirer announcement return is negative (p-value 0.01). We do not, 
however, find such evidence of target-affiliated analysts’ post-announcement 
recommendations. These results indicate that acquirer advisors are more likely to provide 
over-optimistic opinions, particularly when market sentiment is negative.  
B. Long-run Returns 
In this paper, we provide evidence that shareholders are aware of the potential biases 
by acquirer advisors and increase their support for a merger based on certification of deal 
quality by target advisors and affiliated analysts. It is not clear, however, if shareholders 
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votes are indicative of future firm performance. We, therefore, examine whether higher 
shareholder support is associated with better long-term performance.  
Furthermore, acquirer advisors who are overly optimistic on a merger may end up 
recommending deals that perform poorly in the long run. Target advisors, however, 
appear to be more conservative on average and may present opinions that are more likely 
to be in line with the long-term performance of deals. As a result, we also examine the 
relation between advisor opinions (target and acquirer) and the mergers' long-term 
returns.  
B.1. Long-run Returns and Shareholder Voting 
In Panel A of Table VIII, we examine acquirer long-run returns based on 
shareholding voting levels. In particular, we segment all deals based on whether the 
percentage of shareholder support on a deal is above or below the median and track each 
deal for 36 months after its completion to form calendar time portfolios by shareholder 
voting. Portfolio return regressions are run using Fama-French four factors. The 
regression intercepts capture the merged firms' excess performance after controlling for 
the market, size, growth, and momentum factors. Results indicate that all deals 
experience significantly positive alphas (Model 1).
16
 Segmenting these into below and 
above median portfolios, however, we find that only those deals with above median 
shareholder voting (Model 3) experience significantly positive returns. These results are 
                                                            
16
Several studies find negative or insignificant long-run merger returns ((Loughran and Vijh, 1997,Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998, Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).However,these studies do not examine deals in the 2000s.In 
addition, recent studies suggest negative long-run merger returns are driven by data issues (e.g,, benchmark 
and endogeneity). Savor and Lu (2009) suggest stock deals create long-term value after addressing 
endogeneity. 
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consistent with the notion that acquirer shareholders tend to follow the advice of target 
advisors and view these opinions as deal certifications. 
B.2. Long-run Returns and Advisors’ Opinions 
Next, in Panel B of Table VIII, we delineate deals by whether target and acquirer 
advisors provide favorable opinions. Specifically, we calculate an opinion index that 
equals the average value of the equity valuation ranking in Regression (3) of Table III 
and the earnings forecast ranking in Regression (3) of Table V. We do not include the 
affiliated analyst recommendation ranking because this variable is available for only 43 
out of the 136 deals. We then form two sub-samples based on whether an advisor's 
opinion on a deal is above or below the median and track each deal for 36 months after its 
completion to form calendar time portfolios by advisor opinions. We run regressions of 
these portfolio returns on Fama-French four factors.
17
 The regression intercepts capture 
the merged firms' excess performance after controlling for the market, size, growth, and 
momentum factors.  
Panel B of Table VIII reveals that deals where acquirer advisors have a less-
favorable opinion actually perform better than those deals with favorable acquirer advisor 
opinions. The return difference is 1.2% per month, or about 15% annually and this 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that acquirer 
advisors tend to promote deals that do not perform well in the long-run. Such evidence is 
consistent with our main finding that shareholder do not listen to acquirer advisors 
opinions and that acquirer advisors are more likely to be optimistic when the initial 
                                                            
17 Our results are similar if we estimate the abnormal return with Fama-French three-factor model.  
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market sentiment is negative. Target advisor opinions, however, do not appear to have 
predictive power for long-run returns.  
In sum, long-run returns are significantly positive when shareholder votes are above 
the median and significantly lower when acquirer advisors promote a deal. These results 
are consistent with our main finding that acquirer shareholders are able to discern the 
potential bias from their own affiliated advisors, but follow the opinions of target 
advisors. 
C. Shareholder Voting and Advisor Retention 
Our evidence suggests that acquirer shareholders on average are less likely to listen 
to their own financial advisors’ opinions. It is nevertheless possible that in the cross 
section, some merger advisors may be viewed by management as being more able to 
"deliver" shareholder votes. Such advisors may have a better chance to secure future 
deals. If this is the case, acquirer advisors have yet another incentive to provide over 
optimistic opinions. As a result, we examine whether the percentage of shareholder 
support for a deal impacts the likelihood an advisor is retained in future takeovers.  
Table IX examines 334 future mergers by 85 acquirers from our acquirer shareholder 
voting sample that made at least one acquisition within three years after a deal’s effective 
date. We measure acquirer advisor retention based on whether the acquirer uses the same 
advisor in the future deal as in the previous deal. For these future deals, acquirer firms 
retain the same advisor in 57% of the cases when an advisor is utilized. Interestingly, 
acquirer shareholder approval rate is significantly related with advisor retention, even 
after controlling for deal quality and advisor reputation (coefficient of acquirer 
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shareholder approval rate is statistically significant at the 5% in all three models). Using 
model (3) coefficient, we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the 
shareholder voting ratio increases the probability of advisor retention for future deals by 
about 6% (= 12.6%×0.48).  
Results from our earlier tables suggest that acquirer shareholders are aware of 
acquirer advisors’ conflicts of interest and do not alter their voting behavior based on 
their opinions. Managers, however, appear to believe that the merger advisors can 
influence shareholder votes and ultimately deal outcomes. In particular, managers are 
more likely to retain an advisor from a prior merger the higher the shareholder vote for 
this previous deal.  
D.  Financial Advisors’ Opinions and Expected Probability of Merger Completion 
As previously detailed, financial advisors typically receive the bulk of their fees 
conditional upon merger completion. These advisors, therefore, may have stronger 
incentives to promote merger completion if they believe that the deal may not be 
completed. Similarly, if ex ante shareholder support for a deal is high, e.g. when 
management stock ownership is high, financial advisors may not need to provide over-
optimistic opinions to persuade shareholders. In this situation, the management also may 
not need to hire financial advisors with the most optimistic opinions. As a result, the 
opinions of financial advisors may be related to the ex-ante expected probability of 
merger completion.  
To address this potential endogenous issue, using a sample of 564 deals from 2000 
to 2006, we estimate a model of the probability of merger completion similar to that of 
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Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008).
18
 The dependent variable of the regression is a 
binary variable for merger completion. The independent variables include toehold, target 
termination fee, cash payment, relative size, hostility, horizontal merger and tender offer 
dummies, and acquirer managerial and institutional ownership. We next estimate the 
correlation between the expected probabilityof merger completion and the advisor 
opinion variables. If lower ex ante expected probability of merger completion leads to 
more optimistic financial advisor opinions, we expect a negative correlation between the 
expected probability and the opinion variables. Overall, 12 out of 14 correlation estimates 
are statistically insignificant, and one is positive with a p-value of 0.09. The expected 
probability of completion is negatively correlated with only one of the 14 variables 
(acquirer advisor’s analyst recommendation) with a p-value of 0.08.19  This evidence 
suggests that, in our sample, the financial advisor opinion is not endogenously 
determined by the expected probability of merger completion.  
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Voting on mergers and acquisitions is arguably one of the most important corporate 
decisions shareholders have to make. Whether this shareholder decision is influenced by 
the opinions of the financial advisors has important consequence for shareholder wealth 
                                                            
18 The number of observation in this analysis is higher because we do not require voting and financial 
advisor data.From the financial advisor’s point of view, they are also likely to consider all available 
mergers in estimating the probability of completion of the deal they advise.  
19 This negative coefficient is consistent with results in Section 4.4.1 that acquirer advisor’s affiliated 
analysts are more likely to issue optimistic recommendation when announcement returns are negative for 
acquirers. 
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and the effectiveness of regulatory oversight. Further, previous studies demonstrate that 
shareholders, on average, experience significant losses when a firm undertakes an 
acquisition while the merger advisors stand to gain substantial fees when a deal is closed. 
The apparent conflict of interest between the merger advisors and the shareholders 
prompt us to examine the relation between acquirer shareholder voting and financial 
advisor opinions. 
It is possible that shareholders listen to financial advisors’ opinions regardless of the 
potential conflict of interest and are more likely to support a deal when the merger 
opinion is more favorable. Alternatively, shareholders may not value their financial 
advisors’ opinions and no relation will exist between shareholder voting and financial 
advisor opinions. Finally, it is plausible that acquirer shareholders are able to recognize 
the more severe conflict of interest of their own advisors but are more willing to follow 
the opinions of target advisors.  
Our principal result is that acquirer shareholders apparently are able to see through 
their own financial advisors’ conflicts of interest and do not alter their voting decisions 
based on these opinions. These results hold for valuation of target equity, long-term 
earnings forecasts, or affiliated analyst recommendations. Acquirer shareholders, 
however, do appear to listen to the opinions of target financial advisors. These results 
support the active listener hypothesisinthat acquirer shareholders appear more likely to 
consider less over-optimistic opinions when making their voting decisions. Our evidence 
has important implications for shareholder wealth and potential regulatory reforms.  
 
  
32 
 
Table I 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 136 mergers announced from 2000 to 2006 
with acquirer shareholding voting. Panel A provides details on voting characteristics obtained 
from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Voting Analytics database, 8-k filings, Factiva 
News, merger proxy filings, and others.  Panel B details financial advisors’ and analysts’ opinions 
(equity valuation, earnings per share forecasts, and recommendations).  Panel C includes 
variables of firm and deal characteristics from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) merger and 
acquisition (M&A) database as well as from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Continuous variables in Panel C arewinsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and all variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Acquirer shareholder voting (%) N Mean Q1 Median Q3 StdDev 
Management voting rights (%) 136 11.23 2.59 6.67 13.62 14.24 
Advisor-affiliated institutional voting rights (%) 136 1.02 0.00 0.08 1.33 2.07 
Acquirer shareholder approval rate (%) 136 63.21 54.97 64.99 71.62 12.57 
Panel B: Financial advisor's opinions              
Advisors’ equity valuation ratios (%) N Mean Q1 Median Q3 StdDev Percent 
Positive (1) Target advisors  97 -7.22 -20.32 -9.03 -0.78 20.90 23.71 
(2) Acquirer advisors  83 2.94 -6.37 -0.55 7.91 26.08 49.43 
Difference (1) – (2) 67 -10.17 
 
-8.48 
  
-25.72 
p-value of difference 
 
<0.01 
 
<0.01 
  
<0.01 
# deals with advisors’ EPS forecasts Non dilutive Dilutive No forecasts    
Target advisors 71 7 58 
 
 
Acquirer advisors 88 10 38 
 
 
# deals with analysts’ recommendations Initiate Update Drop    
Target-affiliated analysts  2 46 8 
 
 
Acquirer-affiliated analysts  2 65 14 
 
 
Unaffiliated analysts  2 121 3 
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Table I (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Analysts’ post-announcement recommendations N Mean Q1 Median Q3 StdDev 
 (1) Target-affiliated analysts 48 2.19 2.00 2.00 3.00 0.77 
 (2) Acquirer-affiliated analysts  67 2.12 1.75 2.00 3.00 0.73 
 (3) Unaffiliated analysts 123 2.48 2.00 2.50 3.00 0.76 
 Difference (1) – (3) 48 -0.20 
 
-0.07 
 
 
 p-value of difference 
 
0.08 
 
0.16      
Difference (2) – (3) 68 -0.32 
 
-0.20 
 
 
 p-value of difference 
 
<0.01 
 
0.08      
Panel C: Other firm and deal characteristics N Mean Q1 Median Q3 StdDev 
Acquirer firm size ($ millions) 136 4,649 143 371 1,470 16,832 
Target firm size ($ millions) 107 2,319 103 229 1,089 7,204 
Deal Value ($ millions) 136 2,494 86 207 1,243 8,250 
Relative size (%) 136 79.61 38.68 61.25 93.82 93.49 
Percentage with pure stock payment (%) 136 59.45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Acquirer announcement return (%) 136 -2.08 -6.97 -0.95 4.89 12.08 
Acquirer industry-adjusted ROA (%) 136 0.58 -1.37 -0.13 5.29 15.52 
Toehold (%) 136 1.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.60 
Acquirer institutional cross-holding return (%) 136 1.36 -0.25 0.00 2.53 6.06 
Percentage within same industry (%) 136 73.65 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Table II 
Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate and Advisors’ Target Equity Value 
Estimations 
 
This table details univariate analysis of 136 mergers when both acquirer and target firms hire 
financial advisors and focuses on equity value estimations. Panel A analyzes all 136 mergers 
where both acquirer and target firms hire financial advisors. Panel B examines the subset of 67 
deals where both advisors provide equity value (EV) estimations in the merger proxy statements 
for the target firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Statistical significances of 
differences between mean (median) values are determined by t-tests (Wilcoxon tests).  p-values 
are reported in parentheses.   
Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate (%) 
Panel A: Whether advisors provide EV estimations 
  All  
cases 
Provide  
EV estimations 
Do not provide  
EV estimations 
Difference  
(p-value) 
  
(1) (2) (1) - (2) 
      Target Advisors Mean 63.21 64.82 59.19 5.63 (0.02) 
 
Median 64.99 67.27 59.10 8.17 (0.01) 
 
N 136 97 39 
 Acquirer advisors Mean 63.21 64.21 61.64 2.57 (0.24) 
 
Median 64.99 65.22 64.82 0.40 (0.30) 
 
N 136 83 53 
 
Panel B: Whether advisors provide positive EVratios 
    All  
cases 
Positive  
EV ratios 
Negative  
EV ratios 
Difference  
(p-value)     (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Target Advisors Mean 65.72 72.29 64.28 8.01 (0.05) 
 
Median 67.59 73.35 64.83 8.52 (0.05) 
 
N 67 12 55 
 Acquirer advisors Mean 65.72 66.83 64.88 1.95 (0.56) 
 
Median 67.59 69.16 65.61 3.55 (0.24) 
 
N 67 29 38 
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Table III 
Multivariate Tests of Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate and  
Advisors’ Target Equity Value Estimations 
 
This table details the impact of financial advisors’ equity value estimates on acquirer shareholder 
approval rates for 136 mergers when both acquirer and target firms hire financial advisors.  
Model 1 and Model 3 examine all 136 deals while Model 2 examines 67 deals where both 
advisors provide equity value (EV) estimations for the target. Continuous control variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and all variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate (%) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 61.10 75.86 64.61 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Target advisors provide EV estimations 4.57  
  
 
(0.05) 
Target advisors’estimated EV ratios 
 
18.85 
 
 
(0.03) 
Rankings of target advisors’ EV estimations 
  
3.67 
 
(0.02) 
Acquirer advisors provide EV estimations -0.56 
  
 
(0.80) 
Acquirer advisors’ estimated EV ratios 
 
-0.08 
 
 
(0.99) 
Rankings of acquirer advisors’EV estimations 
  
0.28 
 
(0.83) 
Acquirer announcement return (%) 0.11 0.28 0.10 
 
(0.23) (0.07) (0.25) 
Acquirer industry adjusted ROA (%) 0.23 0.20 0.24 
 
(0.00) (0.16) (0.00) 
Relative size (%) 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
 
(0.95) (0.27) (0.92) 
Stock payment dummy -1.66 -5.64 -1.96 
 
(0.45) (0.08) (0.37) 
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Acquirer institutional cross-holding return (%) 0.18 -0.36 0.15 
 
(0.31) (0.17) (0.40) 
Toehold (%) 0.03 -0.08 0.04 
 
(0.76) (0.67) (0.70) 
Same industry dummy -0.19 -3.16 0.21 
 
(0.94) (0.37) (0.93) 
Number of observations 136 67 136 
p-value of chi square test  0.01  0.16  0.01 
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Table IV 
Univariate Tests of Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate  
and Advisors’ EPS Forecasts 
 
This table details univariate analysis of 136 mergers when both acquirer and target firms hire 
financial advisors. Panel A tests whether the existence of EPS forecasts detailed in the merger 
proxy impact acquirer shareholder approval rates while Panel B examines the direction of these 
EPS forecasts.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Statistical significances of differences 
between mean (median) values are determined by t-tests (Wilcoxon tests). p-values are reported 
in parentheses.  
Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate (%) 
Panel A: Whether Advisors Provide EPS Forecasts 
  All Cases ProvideEPS 
Forecasts 
Do not Provide 
EPS Forecasts 
Difference(p-
value) 
   (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Target advisors Mean 63.21 65.91 59.57 6.34 (<0.01) 
 Median 64.99 67.59 58.37 9.22 (<0.01) 
 N 136 78 58  
Acquirer advisors Mean 63.21 63.54 62.36 1.18 (0.63) 
 Median 64.99 65.38 61.68 3.70 (0.51) 
 N 136 98 38  
Panel B: Whether Advisors Provide Non-dilutive EPS Forecasts 
  
AllCases Non-dilutiveEPS 
Forecasts 
Dilutive 
orNoEPS 
Forecasts 
Difference(p-
value) 
   (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Target advisors Mean 63.21 65.37 60.84 4.53(0.04) 
 Median 64.99 67.40 60.07 7.33 (0.03) 
 N 136 71 65  
Acquirer advisors Mean 63.21 63.23 63.17 0.06 (0.98) 
 Median 64.99 64.99 64.91 0.08(0.83) 
  N 136 88 48  
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Table V 
Multivariate Tests of Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate and  
Advisors’ EPS Forecasts 
 
This table details the impact of financial advisors’ EPS forecasts on acquirer shareholder approval 
rates for 136 mergers when both acquirer and target firms hire financial advisors. The dependent 
variable in all three models is the shareholder approval rate. The main independent variable in 
Model 1 is a binary variable whether advisors provide EPS forecasts; in Model 2 it represents 
whether advisors provide non-dilutive EPS forecasts; in Model 3 it equals to one of three advisors’ 
EPS forecasts categories: do not provide EPS forecasts, provide dilutive EPS forecasts, and 
provide non-dilutive EPS forecasts. Continuous control variables are winsorized at the 1% level 
and all variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate (%) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 61.51 63.57 65.40 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Target advisors provide EPS forecasts 6.83 
  (0.00) 
  Target advisors provide non-dilutive EPS forecasts 
 
5.09 
 
 
(0.02) 
 Rankings of target advisors' EPS forecasts 
  
3.12 
  
(0.00) 
Acquirer advisors provide EPS forecasts -0.30 
  (0.90) 
  Acquirer advisors provide non-dilutive EPS forecasts 
 
-0.33 
 
 
(0.88) 
 Rankings of acquirer advisors' EPS forecasts 
  
-0.13 
  
(0.91) 
Acquirer announcement return (%) 0.10 0.11 0.11 
(0.26) (0.22) (0.24) 
Relative size (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.69) (0.81) (0.74) 
Stock payment dummy -2.86 -3.00 -2.98 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.18) 
Acquirer institutional cross-holding return (%) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
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(0.29) (0.32) (0.31) 
Toehold (%) 0.09 0.07 0.08 
(0.44) (0.57) (0.48) 
Same industry dummy -1.54 -2.10 -1.86 
(0.52) (0.38) (0.44) 
Number of observations 136 136 136 
p-value of chi square test  0.07  0.24 0.12  
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Table VI 
Univariate Tests of Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate and  
Advisor Affiliated Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
This table details univariate statistics for 43 deals where both acquirer- and target-
affiliated analysts’ recommendation changes around the deal announcement can be 
identified. Panel A examines whether acquirer shareholder approval rates are higher 
when affiliated analysts provide acquirer recommendations after deal announcement 
while Panel B tests whether approval rates are impacted when affiliated analysts improve 
their recommendations. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Statistical significances 
of differences between mean (median) values are determined by t-tests (Wilcoxon tests). 
p-values are reported in parentheses. 
Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate (%) 
Panel A: Whether affiliated analysts provide recommendations 
  All 
Cases 
Provide 
Recommendations 
Do not Provide 
Recommendations 
Difference 
(p-value) 
     (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Target-affiliated Mean 69.45 70.93 60.35 10.58 (0.03) 
   Analysts Median 70.43 73.49 59.85 3.64 (0.03) 
 N 43 37 6  
Acquirer-affiliated Mean 69.45 69.75 65.49 4.26 (0.53) 
   Analysts Median 70.43 71.34 69.49 1.85 (0.55) 
 N 43  40 3  
Panel B: Whether affiliated analysts improve recommendations 
  All 
Cases 
Improve 
Recommendations 
Do not Improve 
Recommendations 
Difference 
(p-value) 
   (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Target-affiliated Mean 69.45 70.86 62.22 8.64 (0.06) 
   Analysts Median 70.43 72.88 64.66 8.22 (0.05) 
 N 43 36 7  
Acquirer-affiliated Mean 69.45 70.81 63.53 7.28 (0.27) 
   Analysts Median 70.43 73.49 64.02 9.47 (0.10) 
 N 43 35 8  
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Table VII 
Multivariate Tests of Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate and  
Affiliated Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
This table details analysis of 43 deals where both acquirer- and target-affiliated analysts provide 
recommendation for acquirer stock around the deal announcement. Model 1 examines whether 
acquirer shareholder approval rates increase when affiliated analysts provide acquirer 
recommendations after deal announcement. Model 2 tests whether approval rates are impacted 
when affiliated analysts improve their recommendations while Model 3 measures whether 
approval rates are impacted by ranked affiliated analysts’ recommendation changes, where ranks 
based on five categories: initiate, upgrade, keep the same, downgrade, and drop. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and all variables are defined in Appendix A.  
p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate (%) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 55.07 58.82 91.87 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Target-affiliated analysts provide recommendations 11.69   
(0.00)   
Target-affiliated analysts improve recommendations  9.46  
 (0.02)  
Rankings of target-affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations 
  -4.18 
  (0.02) 
Acquirer-affiliated analysts provide 
recommendations 
5.01   
(0.38)   
Acquirer-affiliated analysts improve 
recommendations 
 4.33  
 (0.26)  
Rankings of acquirer-affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations 
  -2.74 
  (0.14) 
Acquirer announcement return (%) 0.18 0.14 0.25 
(0.17) (0.29) (0.07) 
Relative size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.78) (0.59) (0.73) 
Acquirer institutional cross-holding return (%) 0.46 0.41 0.35 
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(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Number of observations 43 43 43 
p-value of chi square test  0.01 0.01 0.01  
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Table VIII 
Long-run Acquirer Returns 
 
This table details long-run returns over three years for our sample acquirer firms. Value-weighted 
portfolios are formed in calendar time each month from 2000 to 2009 based on shareholder 
voting (Panel A), and advisor opinions (Panel B).  In Panel A, results are detailed for all acquirers 
(Model 1), acquirers with lower-than-median shareholder approval rate (Model 2); and acquirers 
with higher-than-median shareholder approval (Model 3). In Panel B, we split the sample by 
whether the advisor opinion index based on EV and EPS rankings is above or below the median 
(for acquirer and target advisors, respectively). Portfolio returns in months with fewer than five 
acquirers are excluded for all models.  Portfolio excess returns are regressed on the Fama-French 
factors and the monthly momentum factor as follows: 
pttptptpftmtppftpt eMOMmHMLhSMBsRRbaRR  )(  
Where(Rpt - Rft) is the excess return of the portfolio; (Rmt - Rft) is the excess return of the market, 
SMBtis the size factor.HMLt is the book-to-market factor, and MOMt is the momentum factor. 
Monthly stock returns are obtained from CRSP while market excess return, SMB, HML, and 
momentum factor are all from Kenneth R. French’s website. p-values are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A:  Long-run Acquirer Returns by Shareholder Voting 
  
Full SamplePortfolio Low VotingPortfolio High VotingPortfolio 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 1.15 0.85 0.86 
 
(0.01) (0.22) (0.01) 
Rm_Rf 0.66 0.73 0.48 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SMB 0.22 0.20 0.36 
 
(0.23) (0.50) (0.02) 
HML -0.25 0.24 -0.01 
 
(0.16) (0.41) (0.97) 
MOM -0.36 -0.63 -0.10 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.27) 
Number of observations 84 84 84 
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Adjusted R2 0.53 0.40 0.43 
 
 
Panel B:  Long-run Acquirer Returns by Advisor Opinions 
  
 Non-favorable 
opinions 
Favorable 
opinions 
Excess Returns 
 (1) (2) (2) – (1) 
Acquirer advisor opinion   
Intercept 
1.33 0.12 -1.21 
 
(0.01) (0.75) (0.03) 
Rm_Rf 0.92 0.60 -0.32 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
SMB 0.14 0.22 0.08 
 
(0.49) (0.19) (0.73) 
HML -0.43 0.71 1.14 
 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
MOM -0.32 -0.04 0.28 
 
(0.01) (0.68) (0.05) 
Number of observations 86 86 86 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.51 0.31 
Target advisor opinion   
Intercept 
1.40 0.76 -0.63 
 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.39) 
Rm_Rf 1.19 0.45 -0.74 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SMB 0.39 0.21 -0.18 
 
(0.10) (0.19) (0.57) 
HML -0.54 0.22 0.77 
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(0.02) (0.15) (0.01) 
MOM -0.20 -0.20 0.00 
 
(0.17) (0.04) (0.98) 
Number of observations 86 86 86 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.39 0.21 
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Table IX 
Acquirer Shareholder Approval Rate and Acquirer Advisor Retention 
 
This table includes 334 future transactions by 85 acquirers from our main sample.  Acquirers’ 
future transactions are collected over the three years after deal completion from SDC. The 
dependent variable equals one if an acquirer advisor is retained in a future deal, and zero 
otherwise. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and all independent 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  p-values are in parentheses. Marginal effects, in square 
brackets, represent the change in the retention probability of the acquirer advisor for an 
independent variable to increase by one, holding all other independent variables constant at mean 
values. 
 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer Advisor Retention 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -3.40 -1.98 -3.83 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Acquirer shareholder approval rate 3.22 2.75 3.53 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
[0.39] [0.33] [0.48] 
Acquirer announcement return (%)  2.46 0.87 
 
 (0.19) (0.67) 
 
 [0.30] [0.12] 
Acquirer advisors’ future reputation  -0.01 -0.02 
 
 (0.76) (0.00) 
 
 [-0.00] [-0.20] 
Future transaction relative size (%)  
 
2.50 
 
 (0.01) 
 
  [0.34] 
Number of observations 334 334 232 
p-value of chi square test  0.00 0.03 0.06  
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CHAPTER II: Stock Price Idiosyncratic Information and  
Merger Investment Decisions 
 
I. Introduction 
Managers and investors both acquire and use firm-specific information in their 
decision making. Traditionally, researchers assume that managers, as insiders, possess all 
firm-specific information, outside investors do not. The set of information that investors 
possess is a subset of managers’ overall information set. Managers’ private firm-specific 
information is conveyed to outside investors through announcements of corporate events, 
such as earnings announcements, changes in dividend policy, changes in leverage, and 
announcements of capital investments, including mergers and acquisitions. This is the 
basis for models of information asymmetry and signaling.  
Recent studies suggest that managers do not possess all firm-specific information. 
Investors can acquire private firm-specific information that is outside the information set 
of managers. Investors can have access to information sources not available to managers 
and/or possess superior skills in analyzing and interpreting information.
20
Given their 
professional expertise and unique talents, investors can collect, analyze, and interpret 
firm-related information, and create their own private firm-specific information. Chen, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) suggest that “This information is more likely to be about the 
demand for the firm’s products or about strategic issues, such as competition with other 
firms” [p. 620]. 
                                                            
20 For example, even with the same set of data, different researchers may come up with different arguments. 
Depending on their academic background, some may end up with publishable papers, but the others may 
not be able to get their work published. 
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Investor’s private firm-specific information is conveyed to managers through the 
channel of stock prices. Informed traders trade on their private firm-specific information 
when the benefit of trading on that information is greater than the cost of collecting and 
analyzing that information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; McNichols and Trueman, 1993; 
Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007). Through this informed trading, investor’s private firm-
specific information is impounded into stock price as idiosyncratic information. A 
growing body of research finds that managerial decisions rely in part on information 
conveyed bystock prices (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Wurgler, 2000; Durnev, Morck, and 
Yeung, 2004; Luo, 2005; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Kau, Linck, and Rubin, 2008; 
Bakke and Whited, 2010).The use of idiosyncratic information by managers in their 
merger and acquisition decisions is the focus of this study. I define stock price 
idiosyncratic information (SPII) as the private information of informed traders about firm 
fundamentals and growth opportunities that is impounded into stock prices via informed 
trading. 
SPII is impounded into stock prices to the extent that the marginal benefit of trading 
on SPII is equal to the marginal cost of this information. Because of differences in the 
cost of acquiring and analyzing information and the differences in transaction costs in 
trading securities, SPII differs across firms, industries, and countries. The quantity and 
quality of information in stock prices is also determined by the attention the stock 
receives from investors. Foucault and Gehrig (2008) present a theoretical model in which 
cross-listing increases the number of informed traders and thus increases the precision of 
the information in stock prices about the value of the firm’s growth opportunities. The 
49 
 
empirical evidence that cross-listing increases SPII is provided by Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2008). Ferreira and Laux (2007) show corporate governance, such as opening to the 
takeover market, increases SPII by encouraging information collection and trading. 
Morck et al. (2000) show countries with stronger property rights have higher SPII.  
SPII can improve capital investment efficiency. Dow and Gorton (1997) present a 
model in which, when managers are given the right incentives, stock price would guide 
managers’ investment decisions in that it provides managers with investors’ private 
information regarding future development opportunities. On the country level, Wurgler 
(2000) finds that, in financial markets with higher SPII, managers increase investment 
more in growing industries and less in declining industries. He argues higher SPII enables 
managers distinguish between good and bad investment through more accurate measures 
of Q. On the industry level, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) find a positive relation 
between industry value-weighted SPII and the investment efficiency, measured by the 
absolute deviation of industry marginal q from one. On the firm level, Chen, Goldstein, 
and Jiang (2007) present empirical evidence that SPII provides managers new 
information about firm fundamentals that managers consider in their investment decisions.  
Previous studies focus on the relation between SPII and the efficiency of internal 
capital investment. My paper considers external investments through mergers and 
acquisitions. Major firm expansions are generally accomplished through mergers and 
acquisitions rather than through internal capital investments (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2002). Andrade and Stafford (2004) find that both mergers and internal capital 
investments are responsive to the firm’s growth opportunities as measured by q. I 
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examine whether SPII provides managers new information about the value of growth 
opportunities and thus improve merger investment decisions. This is my learning 
hypothesis. 
The argument that managers learn from the market in making merger investment 
decisions has been supported by evidence in recent studies. Kau, Linck, and Rubin (2008) 
find a positive correlation between merger completion probability and the acquiring 
firm’s announcement period stock return, indicating that acquirer managers decide to 
finally complete a deal when the market’s valuation of the acquirer’s merger gain is 
higher. Studying friendly-negotiated mergers only, Luo (2005) show a positively relation 
between merger completion probability and the combined merger announcement return, 
indicating managers learn from the market new information about deal valuation. 
Different from these studies that examine manager learning after merger announcement, I 
study whether managers learn useful information from the stock market before a merger 
is announced.  
Both merger investment and internal capital investment expand the asset base and 
productive capacity in firms requiring additional capacity due to growth in demand (Gort, 
1969; Andrade and Stafford, 2004). Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) theoretically model 
the relation between the value of growth opportunities (measured by q) and the decision 
to expand production capacity through merger investment and internal investment. They 
demonstrate empirically that both investments are positively related to q. Further, 
because of higher fixed cost, they find merger investment is more sensitive to q. Chen et 
al. (2007) and Foucault and Fresard (2010) indicate SPII increases the accuracy of q and 
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consequently managers are more sensitive to q when making internal investment 
decisions. I hypothesize if SPII provides managers new information about the value of 
growth opportunities, SPII would increase the merger investment sensitivity to q. 
Second, I examine the relation between SPII and merger efficiency. I use two 
measures of merger efficiency- (1)acquirer announcement period stock return; (2) 
combined announcement period stock return of acquiring and target firms; (3) change in 
post-merger return-on-assets (ROA). Prior studies show SPII increases internal 
investment efficiency because it provides managers with more precise information about 
the value of growth opportunities (Wurgler, 2000;Durnev et al., 2004; Foucault and 
Gehrig, 2008). Because merger efficiency increases with the value of growth 
opportunities (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002), I hypothesize acquirer SPII increases 
acquirer merger gains and total merger gains. Moreover, Devos, Kadapakkam, and 
Krishnamurthy (2009) find more than 80% of merger synergies come from operating 
synergies. If managers have a better understanding of firm fundamentals, they are better 
able to assess operating synergies created by the merger, which leads to higher merger 
gains. I expect, therefore, SPII would increase merged firm operating performance. 
Next, I examine what firm characteristics motivate mangers to learn useful 
information from SPII. I hypothesize that SPII is more likely to increase merger 
efficiency when the acquirer has more development opportunities, when the acquirer 
management has higher skills, and/or when the acquirer corporate governance is stronger. 
When the acquirer has more development opportunities, managers are more likely to use 
SPII to identify the best merger candidate for higher merger efficiency. I use Tobin’s q to 
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measure growth opportunities. I hypothesize acquirer SPII is more likely positively 
related with merger efficiency when acquirer Tobin’s q is higher. Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1989) argue high q can be driven by management skill. Managers with higher 
skills are more able to use SPII to identify good merger opportunities and thus to create 
higher merger efficiency. I expect, therefore, acquirer SPII more likely increases merger 
efficiency when the acquirer management has higher skills.  
I hypothesize that SPII increases merger investment efficiency in firms with stronger 
monitoring. Agency theory argues that managers make corporate decisions to promote 
their own interests (Jensen, 1976). Kau et al. (2008) find that managers are more likely to 
learn from the market in making merger consummation decisions when they are under 
stricter governance. Blockholders have the incentive to monitor management decisions 
(Shleifer and Vishney, 1986; Shivdasani, 1993; Denis and Serrano, 1996). I hypothesize, 
when acquirer blockholder ownership is higher, SPII is more likely positively related 
with merger efficiency. 
The key variable in my study is acquirer SPII. Previous studies suggest stock price 
non-synchronicity can measure SPII. Examining the relation between R
2
 and the release 
of public firm-specific information, Roll (1988) suggests the stock price change that 
cannot be explained by the market return or public firm-specific information may reflect 
investors’ private firm-specific information. Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) 
show, when stock price non-synchronicity is higher, stock price is more predictive of 
future earnings, indicating stock price non-synchronicity is positively associated with 
investors’ private firm-specific information. Empirical studies on SPII and investment 
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efficiency, such as Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Ferreira and Laux (2007), and 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) use stock price non-synchronicity to measure SPII. 
Following these studies, I use the stock price non-synchronicity from the market model 
controlling for industry return during one year before deal announcement to measure the 
pre-announcement SPII.  
My sample includes 2,018 major merger transactions announced during the period 
from 1990 to 2006. I find acquirer SPII increases the sensitivity of merger investment to 
Tobin’s q, consistent with my learning hypothesis. In addition, acquirer SPII increases 
acquirer announcement return, combined announcement return, long-term abnormal 
return, and post-merger operating performance.
21
 These results support the hypothesis 
that SPII helps managers identify good merger investment opportunities. Furthermore, 
the positive relation between acquirer SPII and acquirer merger gains is mainly driven by 
the subsample where the acquirer has higher q or higher blockholder ownership. These 
results suggest managers are more efficient in learning investors’ private firm-specific 
information when the acquirer has more development opportunities, when the acquirer 
management skill is higher, and/or when managers are under stricter monitoring. 
In robustness tests, I show some evidence that some of my results still hold with the 
use of different measures of SPII, including the non-synchronicity from the model 
controlling for Fama-French factors and the accounting measure of SPII in Durnev et al. 
                                                            
21Campbell et al. (1997) argues that price non-synchronicity is important in event studies. The statistical 
significance of abnormal event-related returns is determined by the stock return non-synchronicity relative 
to the market or industry return volatility. Stocks with high non-synchronicity are more likely detected of 
abnormal returns. However, we consider this would only increase the dispersion of abnormal returns if the 
SPII does not improve merger decisions. 
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(2003). My results do not hold when I measure SPII with the (1-R
2
) in Chen et al. (2007) 
or the PIN number in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002). I consider this could be 
because of the data limitation.
22
I use the 2-SLS regressions to control the endogeneity of 
SPII. I choose firm age and high-tech industry dummy as instrumental variables that are 
related with SPII but not related with acquirer merger gains. I find SPII still significantly 
increases acquirer merger gains. Last, but not the least, SPII may improve merger 
decisions because of enhanced corporate monitoring (Defond and Hung, 2004; Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1982; Holmström and Tirole, 1993). I do not exclude this monitoring 
hypothesis but argue that manager learning from the stock market can be one of the 
reasons that SPII is associated with merger investment decisions.  
My study contributes to the literature that managers learn useful information from 
the stock market in making corporate decisions. Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), 
Giammarino, Heinkel, Hollifield, and Li (2004), Luo (2005), and Kau et al. (2008) show 
evidence that managers learn new information from the stock market in making SEO and 
merger completion decisions. My paper extends these studies by showing that managers 
also learn from the stock market in making merger investment decisions. My study also 
contributes to the literature that the stock market efficiency improves investment 
decisions. Previous studies show SPII increases internal investment only (Morck et al., 
                                                            
22Durnev et al. (2004) comment that (1-R2) has the econometrically undesirable characteristic of being 
bounded within the unit interval. We consider this could be the main reason for insignificant results. The 
PIN number is collected from Dr. Søren Hvidkjaer’s website. This annual PIN number is based on every 
calendar year until 2001. Less than half of our sample has matched PIN’s. Firm characteristics show these 
observations are not representative of the whole sample. 
55 
 
2000; Durnev et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2007). This paper shows that external investment 
through merger transactions is also related with SPII.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
sample collection. Section 3 explains my research methodology and empirical results. 
Section 4 discusses additional tests. And Section 5 concludes.  
II. Data and Sample Collection 
A. Measure Stock Price Idiosyncratic Information (SPII) 
I define SPII as the informed traders’ private information about firm fundamentals 
and development opportunities that is impounded into stock price via informed trading. 
Because of costly information, informed traders must get compensated for their 
information collecting and analyzing. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), McNichols and 
Trueman (1993), and Foucault and Gehrig (2008) theoretically demonstrate that SPII 
decreases with information collection cost and increases with the number of informed 
traders and the amount of information that informed traders have. Morck et al. (2000), 
Ferreira and Laux (2007), Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), provide empirical evidence that 
SPII differs because of information cost.   
Roll (1988) examines to what degree stock price changes can be attributed to firm-
specific news. He finds that the systematic risk explained by the market model is quite 
modest. Further, the R
2
 in the censored samples excluding dates when firm-specific news 
are publicly released into the market does not increase significantly. He, therefore, 
suggests, “The financial press misses a great deal of relevant information generated 
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privately” [p.564]. However, he acknowledges that another explanation may also be 
possible – “(the existence of) occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information” 
[p.566]. Following studies provide evidence that stock price non-synchronicity reflects 
idiosyncratic information about firm fundamentals rather than market noise.  
Durnev et al. (2003) show that stock price non-synchronicity is positively related 
with accounting measure of SPII, defined as the extent to which stock price contains 
information about future earnings. As idiosyncratic information is impounded into stock 
prices through informed trading, other studies show that stock price non-synchronicity 
increases with profit and decreases with the cost of informed trading. Morck et al. (2000) 
show countries with poor protection of private property rights have lower stock price 
non-synchronicity. They argue the informed trading is more costly and unattractive when 
political events and rumors would easily cause market-wide stock price swings, which 
decreases stock price non-synchronicity. Ferreira and Laux (2007) argue that anti-
takeover provisions reduce stock price non-synchronicity because these provisions 
decrease the profit from anticipating a potential bidding offer. 
Following Durnev et al., (2004), Ferreira and Laux (2007), Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2008), and Morck et al., (2000), I use stock price non-synchronicity to measure SPII. It 
equals 





 
2
21
ln
i
i
R
R
, where R
2
 is from the market model regression (1) controlling for 
industry value-weighted return during the period (-295, -43) before the deal 
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announcement.
23
I only keep the non-synchronicity when there are more than 100 daily 
stock return observations.  
itftjtftmtftit RRRRRR   )(*)( (1)
24
 
Rit is firm i’s stock return, Rmt is market value-weighted return, Rjt is industry value-
weighted return, and Rft is the risk-free return.I define industries by 3-digit SIC codes.  
Table 1 shows that the mean and median acquirer SPII are 2.26 and 2.04, 
respectively. Since idiosyncratic risk equals 



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
 
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21
ln
i
i
R
R
, the average R
2
 is about 10%, 
which is smaller than 17% in Chen et al. (2007). It indicates that the market model 
explains less stock price movements in acquirer firms than in other non-acquiring firms, 
suggesting that acquirer stock price may has more idiosyncratic information. 
B. Sample Selection 
I select merger transactions from SDC that are disclosed value mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), leveraged buyouts, tender offers, and exchange offers. I require that 
the pre-merger acquirer ownership in the target is less than 50%, the merger transaction 
involves transfer of control, and the deal value is at least $10 million. Considering that 
financial firms and utility firms have very different characteristics in information 
disclosure and industry regulation, I exclude these firms from my sample. I also require 
                                                            
23 Schwert (1996) presents evidence of merger-related information leakage from 42 days before deal 
announcement. Our calculation period for non-synchronicity, therefore, ends at 43 days before deal 
announcement. 
24 As Morck (2000) claim, although this equation is a classical asset pricing equation, we do not pursue the 
asset pricing interpretation of the tradeoff between risk and return; instead, we treat is as an application of 
Grossman (1976) and Roll’s (1988) approach to information capitalization. 
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that the merger is either completed or withdrawn. During the period from 1990 to 2006, I 
collect 2,482 merger transactions from SDC database. Among these merger transactions, 
I delete those where the merging firms have the same PERMNO’s from CRSP and where 
the acquirer does not have enough stock return data to calculate non-synchronicity. My 
final sample contains 2,018 mergers and acquisitions announced from 1990 to 2006. 
Panel B in Table 1 presents the dependent variables of merger investment decisions. 
Following Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), I define merger investment as deal value 
divided by book value of assets at the end of previous fiscal year.
25
 It measures relative 
merger spending in a firm. This measure is similar to that in Chen et al. (2007), who use 
the capital expenditure scaled by beginning-of-year assets to measure firm capital 
investment. Acquirer merger investment has the mean of 1.14 and the median of 0.39, 
which is significantly larger than capital investment spending (Chen et al., 2007). This is 
reasonable since the main corporate expansion is through mergers and acquisitions 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002).  
I use acquirer announcement return and combined announcement return to measure 
acquirer merger performance at around merger announcement.
26
 Following Luo (2005), I 
calculate acquirer announcement return as the accumulated abnormal return during (-1, 
                                                            
25 According to the definition in SDC, deal value is the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, 
excluding fees and expenses. The dollar value includes the amount paid for all common stock, common 
stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six 
months of the announcement date of the transaction. 
26 The definition of SPII is based on the weaker version of capital market efficiency (Jensen, 1978). In 
analyzing the event study methodology in this weaker form market efficiency, Fama (1991) argues “with 
respect to firm-specific events, the adjustment of stock prices to new information is efficient” [p.1602]. 
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+7) around deal announcement. Acquirer announcement return is significantly lower than 
zero with the mean and median of -1.80% and -1.28%, respectively, indicating that 
market reacts negatively to the overall merger proposals. The acquirer announcement 
return for pure cash paid deals has the mean and median of 1.4% and 1.1%, respectively. 
The negatively announcement return, therefore, is mainly driven by equity-paid deals, 
which is consistent with the overvalued equity literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Dierkens, 1991).  
I calculate combined merger return as the value-weighted acquirer and target 
announcement return, where target announcement return equals the accumulated 
abnormal return during (-43, +7) around deal announcement that includes the period of 
target stock price run-up (Schwert, 1996). I use acquirer and target firm market 
capitalization at 2 and 44 days before deal announcement as the weight. Panel B in Table 
2 shows that the average combined merger return is statistically positive, indicating that 
merger transactions create value but mainly accrues to the target shareholders (Eckbo, 
2009). Following Harford (2005) and Chen et al. (2007), I use the post-merger ROA 
growth to measure change in combined firm operating performance. Panel B in Table 1 
shows that the post-merger ROA growth is negative, which suggests that merger 
transactions do not improve combined firm performance. 
Panel C in Table 1 shows the statistics for control variables. Managerial private firm-
specific information is related with merger transactions (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
Following Chen et al. (2007), I use the average of absolute abnormal return (-1, +1) at 
around the previous four quarterly earnings announcements before the deal 
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announcement to measure asymmetric information. Acquirer asymmetric information has 
the mean and median of 0.03 and 0.02, respectively. This is smaller than those in Chen et 
al. (2007). Given that my sample period covers more recent years, it indicates that 
acquirer firms have lower information asymmetry as well as the firms in recent years 
have lower information asymmetry. This is consistent with Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, 
and Xu (2001) who suggests that the firm-specific information impounded into stock 
price is increasing over the years.  
The acquirer firm has on average higher return-on-equity and Tobin’s q than the 
target, suggesting that merger investment facilitates resource reallocation to more 
efficient use (Gort, 1969; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; 
Harford, 2005).  The average acquirer cash holding is 0.18, which is higher than 0.12 in 
average firms (Chen et al., 2007), indicating that managers in firms with more cash flows 
are more likely to make merger transactions. Merger relative size has the mean of 0.44 
and the median of 0.22, suggesting that the sample merger transactions are important 
corporate investment decisions that managers make. Other deal characteristic variables 
show that most of my sample merger transactions are friendly negotiated deals that reach 
mutual agreement at deal completion.  
III. Empirical Results 
In this section, I analyze empirical test results. Section 3.1 examines the relation 
between SPII and the sensitivity of merger investment on the value of growth 
opportunities measured by q. Section 3.2 shows the impact of acquirer SPII on acquirer 
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and total merger returns. Section 3.3 presents the manager’s learning efficiency 
depending on the management skills and informed shareholders. 
A. SPII and Merger Investment Sensitivity to Q 
Chen et al. (2007) find SPII increases the internal investment sensitivity to q. They 
attribute this relation to the fact that SPII provides managers with new information about 
the value of investment opportunities. Foucault and Fresard (2010) find internal 
investment sensitivity to q increases after cross-listing, indicating that cross-listing 
increases the new information about the value of growth opportunities. Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2002) shows that merger investment is also sensitive to q. Following these 
studies, I set up the following regression to test whether SPII increases merger investment 
sensitivity to q.  
itiiiiiiii IAQIAIDIOQQIDIOMI   ******                         (2) 
For the acquirer firm i, MIi is its merger investment, IDIOi is SPII, and Qi is Tobin’s 
Q. Since merger investment can be initiated by managers’ private information about 
equity misevaluation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), I include IAi to control for the 
asymmetric information. If SPII increases merger investment sensitivity to q,  should be 
positive and statistically significant. 
In Table 2, Model (1) shows that acquirer SPII increases merger investment 
sensitivity to q. The coefficient is 0.10, with the p-value less than 0.01. This is consistent 
with my learning hypothesis that managers are more likely to take out merger investment 
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when they learn more information about the value of growth opportunities from stock 
price. I find, however, q is not statistically related with merger investment, indicating that 
merger investment can be initiated by reasons other than growth opportunities, such as 
overvalued equity (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), managerial hubris (Roll, 1986), and 
empire building (Jensen, 1986). Since overvalued equity links merger investment with 
stock price that is included in calculation of q, I find acquirer asymmetric information 
increases the sensitivity of merger investment to q, indicating that managers are more 
likely to initiate merger investment when they observe overvalued equity.  
Given both SPII and asymmetric information increase merger investment sensitivity 
to q, I further use the subsamples of cash and stock deals to examine whether these 
relations are driven by the same reason. In Model (2) I include mergers paid with cash 
only, I find the SPII still increases the sensitivity of merger investment to q but 
asymmetric information does not do so. The coefficients of the interaction term of SPII 
and acquirer q is 0.12, with the p-value less than 0.01. The coefficients of the interaction 
term of asymmetric information and acquirer q is 1.30, but the p-value is 0.57.  
In Model (3), I include stock paid deals only. Both SPII and asymmetric information 
increases acquirer merger investment sensitivity to q. Therefore, asymmetric information 
increases merger investment when stock price is high only in stock paid deals, consistent 
with the overvalued equity motivation. Since firms with more growth opportunities tend 
to use stock payment for future investment flexibility (Myers, 1977; Martin, 1996), the 
fact that SPII also increases merger investment sensitivity to q in stock payment mergers 
is consistent with my learning hypothesis.  
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B. SPII and Acquirer Merger Performance 
When managers engage in internal investment to seize growth opportunities, SPII 
increases investment efficiency because it provides managers with more information 
about the value of growth opportunities (Morck et al., 2000; Durnev et al., 2004; Chen et 
al., 2007; Foucault and Gehrig, 2008). When managers learn from the stock market the 
value of growth opportunities in making merger investment decisions, SPII should also 
increases acquirer and total merger gains.  
The definition of SPII is based on the weaker version of capital market efficiency 
(Jensen, 1978). In analyzing the event study methodology in this weaker form market 
efficiency, Fama (1991) argues “with respect to firm-specific events, the adjustment of 
stock prices to new information is efficient” [p.1602]. I use acquirer announcement return, 
combined announcement return, and post-merger operating performance to measure 
acquirer gains from the merger and set up the following regressions.  
icontrolcontroliii DealACQIAIDIOACAR   ***                       (3) 
icontrolcontrolcontroliii DealTGTACQIAIDIOCCAR   **** (4) 
icontrolcontrolcontroliii DealTGTACQIAIDIOROAG   **** (5) 
For the acquirer firm i, ACARi is acquirer abnormal merger announcement return, 
CCARi is combined abnormal merger announcement return, and ROAGi is the average 
acquirer ROA growth over three years after deal completion. IDIOi is SPII, IAi is 
asymmetric information, and ACQcontrol, TGTcontrol, and Dealcontrol are controls for acquirer, 
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target and deal characteristics, respectively. If SPII improves acquirer merger gains, the 
 ’s in these regressions should be positive and statistically significant.  
Deal characteristics affect merger returns. Managers of large firms are more likely 
overconfident and overpay (Roll, 1986). The relative size is another control for the size 
effect. Empirical studies find mixed results that acquirer return can be positively or 
negatively related with relative size (Moeller Schilingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Loughran 
and Vijh, 1997). Managers in firms with better pre-merger performance, measured by 
return-on-equity ratio and q, may have higher management skills that improve merger 
decisions. Managers at firms with more free cash flows are more likely to undertake 
merger transactions for empire building(Jensen, 1986).High leverage ratio reduces future 
free cash flows and thus limits managerial corporate decisions for empire 
building(Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell, 1993).  
Deal characteristics affect merger returns. Stock payment decreases acquirer return 
because it signals overvalued equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Compared to friendly-
negotiated mergers, tender offers are more likely driven by merger synergy, which 
increases merger return (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983). Hostile takeover is an 
important method of correcting managerial failure (Rappaport,1990). Choi (1991) argues 
that toehold investment facilitates value-enhancing takeovers. Diversification may 
decrease merger returns because of the diversification discount (Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1990; Campa and Kedia, 2002). 
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Table 3 shows the results of acquirer SPII on acquirer merger gains. The dependent 
variable in Model (1) is acquirer announcement return. The data shows acquirer SPII 
significantly increases acquirer announcement return, with the coefficient of 
0.65andthep-value of 0.02. It suggests that more information about the value of growth 
opportunities increases acquirer shareholder gain from the merger investment. Acquirer 
information asymmetry is negative but not significant. In unreported tests, I find acquirer 
information asymmetry decreases acquirer announcement return in stock payment deals, 
indicating that shareholders’ perception of overvalued equity increases when managers 
with more private information pay for the target with acquirer equity. In stock payment 
deals, however, acquirer SPII still increases acquirer announcement return.  
The dependent variable in Model (2) is combined merger return. The coefficient of 
acquirer SPII is 0.71, statistically significant at the 3% level, indicating that SPII informs 
managers of more information about the value of growth opportunities so that it 
facilitates managers to find the best merger candidate for higher merger synergies. 
Acquirer firm size decreases merger returns, consistent with hubris hypothesis (Roll, 
1986). Relative size has mixed results on merger returns, consistent with the previous 
literature that it has a mixed effect on merger returns (Moeller et al., 2004; Loughran and 
Vijh, 1997). Acquirer cash holding decreases merger returns, consistent with the agency 
theory of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Deal completion increases merger returns, which 
is consistent with the argument that the announcement return includes the information 
about merger completion expectation (Luo, 2005). Acquirer Tobin’s q increases merger 
return, indicating that mergers create transaction through resource reallocation to more 
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efficient use (Lang et al., 1989; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). Stock payment dummy 
decreases merger returns, indicating overvalued equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Devos et al. (2009)argue that most merger synergies come from operating synergies. 
Chen et al. (2007) suggest that the information managers learn from the market may be 
more likely about the information about the demands of the firm products or about 
competition with other firms. Therefore, I test whether SPII improves combined firm 
operating performance measured by ROA growth. The result shows that post-merger 
ROA growth is positively related with acquirer pre-merger SPII. The coefficient is 0.11, 
with the p-value of 0.03.Acquirer information asymmetry increases sales growth, 
indicating that to purchase assets with overvalued equity increases firm performance in 
the long run (Savor and Lu, 2009). Overall, the results in Table 3 support the argument 
that SPII increases acquirer and total merger gains.  
Studies on firm long-run performance indicate that the market may not fully reflect 
the information about a certain corporate event. Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
and Harford (2005), I use the calendar portfolio approach to study the combined firm 
long-run performance.
27
 First, I compose two portfolios of acquirer firms depending on 
whether the acquirer firm has higher- or lower-than-median SPII. Each acquirer is 
included in either portfolio from one month after deal effective date until three years 
afterwards. Then, every month, I calculate the one month value-weighted return for the 
                                                            
27This methodology does not suffer from problems such as the positive cross-correlations in bidding firms, 
the transaction cost in rebalancing strategy, and the assumed unchanging firm risk as in the methodology of 
calculating buy-and-hold returns and forming event-time portfolios. 
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portfolio. I keep the portfolio return only if the portfolio includes more than five acquirer 
firms. Third, each vector of one-month portfolio returns is regressed on the monthly 
Fama-French factor realizations. A significant intercept shows the portfolio abnormal 
long-run return. Similar to Harford (2005), I also regress the return of the portfolio 
including all acquirers on Fama-French factor realizations and a dummy variable of 
higher idiosyncratic information. The positive coefficient of the dummy variable 
indicates that acquirer SPII increases long-run return. The following equations show the 
portfolio return regressions.  
  pttttftmtftpt MOMHMLSMBRRRR   ****                (6) 
  pttttftmtpftpt MOMHMLSMBRRIDIODaRR   ****_*
                                                                                                                                           (7)  
(Rpt - Rft) is the excess return of the portfolio. D_IDIO is a dummy variable that the 
acquirer has higher-than-median SPII. (Rmt - Rft) is the excess return of the market. SMBt 
is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three 
big portfolios. HMLt is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average 
return on the two growth portfolios, and MOMt is the monthly momentum factor. I expect 
the in equation (6) and the   in equation (7) are positively significant. 
Table 4 Model (1) includes the subsample where acquirer firms have higher-than-
median SPII. The statistically significant intercept of 0.99 indicates the acquirer firms 
with higher pre-merger SPII earn positive long-run returns over three years after deal 
completion. Model (2) also shows that acquirer firms with low SPII gain positive long-
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run returns. The intercept is 0.72, with the p-value less than 0.01. To further examine 
whether the long-run returns in the two subsamples are statistically different, I add in 
Model (3) a dummy variable of higher-than-median SPII. The data shows that the 
coefficient of this dummy variable is 0.54, with the p-value of 0.04. Therefore, acquirer 
firms with high SPII win higher long-run abnormal returns. My results suggest that 
acquirer merger performance in the long run is also positively related with its SPII. 
C. Manager Learning Efficiency 
C.1. Manager Learning Efficiency by q 
Tobin’s q has been used in studies as a measure of management capability and/or 
growth opportunities (Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991).In Table 5, I run the regressions 
of acquirer merger performance on acquirer SPII in each subsample classified by the 
sample median Tobin’s q. Model (1) and Model (2) show that acquirer announcement 
return is positively related with SPII when acquirer Tobin’s q is high. The coefficient in 
Model (1) is 1.12, with the p-value of 0.01. The coefficient in Model (2) is 0.20, with the 
p-value of 0.61. Model (3) and Model (4) show that merger combined return is positively 
related with SPII only when acquirer Tobin’s q is high. The coefficient in Model (3) is 
1.11, with the p-value of 0.02. The coefficient in Model (4) is 0.51, with the p-value of 
0.27. In Model (5) and Model (6), the results show that only when the acquirer firm has 
higher-than-median q, acquirer SPII increases post-merger ROA growth. The coefficient 
of acquirer SPII is 1.46 and the p-value is 0.09 when acquirer q is higher. On the other 
hand, when acquirer q is lower, the coefficient of acquirer SPII is not statistically 
significant. Overall, in Table 5, I find some evidence that acquirer SPII is more closely 
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related with acquirer merger performance when acquirer Tobin’s q is high. The results 
support the hypothesis that manager learning is more efficient when the firm has more 
growth opportunities and/or higher management skills. 
C.2. Manager Learning Efficiency by Blockholder Ownership 
Table 6 tests whether managers can more efficiently learn from the stock market 
when blockholder ownership is high. Model (1) includes the subsample where the 
acquirer blockholder ownership is higher than the sample median. The coefficient of 
acquirer firm-specific information is 0.97, significant at the 2% level. In Model (2), when 
acquirer has lower blockholder ownership, the coefficient of acquirer SPII loses 
significance. Acquirer SPII, therefore, increases acquirer announcement return only when 
blockholder ownership is high. Models (3) and (4) show that, only when acquirer 
blockholder ownership is higher than sample median, acquirer SPII increases combined 
merger return. The coefficient in Model 3 is 1.10, with the p-value of 0.03. The 
coefficient in Model 4 is 0.27, with the p-value of 0.55. Models (5) and (6) confirm that 
acquirer SPII significantly improves post-merger operating performance when the 
acquirer has high blockholder ownership. The coefficient is 1.49, with the p-value of 
0.04. All these results provide supportive evidence that acquirer managers are more likely 
to learn SPII when they can identify informed blockholders for their SPII or when the 
firm is under stricter monitoring. 
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IV. Additional Tests 
A. Other Measures of SPII 
Fama and French (1993) find that stock return is related with size and equity 
valuation. In addition, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) argue that stock return is also related 
with the momentum factor. I, therefore, include these factors in the market model 
regression and define idiosyncratic information as the stock price non-synchronicity from 
the model. Panel A in Table 7 shows that SPII increases acquirer and combined merger 
announcement return with this measure. Durnev et al., (2004) argue that the non-
synchronicity is the logistic transformation of (1-R
2
). Chen et al. (2007) directly use (1-
R
2
) to measure of SPII. Panel B and Panel C, however, do not show that SPII increases 
acquirer merger performance when measured with (1-R
2
). Durnev et al. (2004) comment 
that (1-R2) has the econometrically undesirable characteristic of being bounded within 
the unit interval.It indicates that the bounded nature of (1-R
2
) may reduce the statistical 
results.   
Another measure is the probability of informed trading (PIN). Easley and O’Hara 
(1992) propose a market microstructure model explaining that trading process contains 
more information than individual transactions. Following a series of theoretical and 
empirical studies, the authors empirically estimate PIN for each NYSE-listed stock from 
1983 to 1998. With the PIN data from Søren Hvidkjaer’s website, I present the regression 
results in Panel D of Table 8. The results are not significant. Because of the limited data, 
I only have 814 acquirer firms have the PIN number matched. Comparing firm 
characteristics, I find that acquirers with PIN number have larger firm sizes, higher 
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return-on-equity, lower Tobin’s q, higher leverage ratio, and less cash holdings. 
Therefore, the subsample with PIN number cannot represent the whole sample, which 
may cause different results.   
The third measure for SPII is the accounting measure of stock price informativeness. 
Durnev et al. (2003) argue that stock prices are more informative of firm-specific 
information when they are more predictable of future earnings. Similar to their 
methodology but focusing on each individual firm, I use the residual from the regression 
of stock return on future earnings to measure investor’s firm-specific information. The 
larger the residual, the less is SPII. The data in Panel E shows that acquirer idiosyncratic 
information is positively related with acquirer merger performance, but the coefficient is 
significant only in the combined return regression. 
Overall, when I use other measures, I still find some evidence that acquirer SPII is 
positively related with acquirer merger performance. 
B. Control for Endogeneity of SPII 
SPII is not exogenous. Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2010) theoretically 
demonstrate that the incentive to produce information about firms’ development 
opportunities increases when these opportunities are ex-ante more profitable. That is, 
when investors expect that managers would make profitable merger transactions, they 
have the incentive to collect the idiosyncratic information. The relation between SPII and 
acquirer merger performance, therefore, may not be because the managers learn from the 
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market but because of the market expectation effect. To address this issue, I employ a 
2SLS model that controls for the endogeneity of SPII.   
In the first regression, I use the acquirer SPII as the dependent variable and use 
instrument variables that are related with SPII but are unlikely related with expected 
merger returns. I select the firm age and high-tech dummy as the instrument variables. 
The market less likely know much about firms just listed, the value of the idiosyncratic 
information, therefore, is higher. This may increase informed investors’ incentive to 
collect and trade the idiosyncratic information. On the other hand, firm age is not related 
with merger returns. Firm age, therefore is one of the instrument variables. Luo (2005) 
argue that investors of high-tech firms are less likely to have idiosyncratic information 
because the managers possess the professional knowledge that is the key to firm 
competitiveness and performance. High-tech industry dummy, however, is less likely 
related with merger returns. It is another instrument variable. Further, to confirm that 
these two variables are not related with merger returns, I include them in the unreported 
merger return regressions and none of them is significant. 
Table 8 shows, in the first step regression, acquirer SPII is negatively related with 
firm age and high-tech dummy. The coefficient of acquirer firm age is -0.14, significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficient of acquirer high-tech dummy is -0.55, significant at the 1% 
level. The results suggest that investors have more incentive to collect and analyze 
idiosyncratic information for younger firms and non-hightech firms, which is consistent 
with my expectation. In the second step regressions, I test whether the residual SPII is 
still positively related with acquirer merger performance.  
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Panel B in Table 8 shows that acquirer SPII increases acquirer and combined merger 
returns. In Model (1) where the dependent variable is acquirer announcement return, the 
coefficient of SPII is 0.60, with the p-value of 0.03. In Model (2) where the dependent 
variable is combined announcement return, the coefficient of SPII is 0.66, with the p-
value of 0.03. So, even after controlling for the endogeneity issue, acquirer SPII still 
increases acquirer merger performance at around merger announcement. Model (3) uses 
the acquirer sales growth as the dependent variable. The coefficient of acquirer SPII is 
0.88, with p-value of 0.06. Overall, the results in Model (3) suggest that my main results 
are not solely driven by the endogeneity issue of SPII. 
V. Conclusions 
SPII is positively related with investment efficiency because it provides manager 
with new information about the value of growth opportunities (Wurgler, 2000; Durnev et 
al., 2004; Chen et al., 2007). Mergers and acquisitions, one of the most important 
corporate investment decisions, are also positively related with the value of growth 
opportunities (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). This paper examines whether SPII is 
related with merger investment decisions. Specifically, I ask whether managers learn the 
value of growth opportunities from the SPII, whether manager learning increases 
shareholder value, and what factors are associated with the manager learning efficiency.  
Following Durnev et al. (2004), Ferreira and Laux (2007), Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2008), and Morck et al. (2000), I use stock price non-synchronicity to measure SPII. In a 
sample of 2,018major merger transactions announced from 1990 to 2006, I find that 
acquirer SPII is positively related with merger investment sensitivity to q. It increases 
74 
 
acquirer and combined merger announcement returns. It also improves acquirer firm 
operating performance and long-run returns. These results support my manager learning 
hypothesis.  
Further, I examine the factors that are related with manager learning efficiency. I 
find the relation between SPII and acquirer merger performance is mainly driven by the 
acquirers with high Tobin’s q, indicating that managers are more likely to learn the 
information from the stock market in making merger decisions when they are more 
capable to identify a good merger candidate or when the firm has high growth 
opportunities. The relation between SPII and acquirer merger performance is mainly 
driven by the acquirers with high blockholder ownership, indicating that managers are 
more likely to learn the information from the stock market in making merger decisions 
when they are under stricter monitoring. In addition, my results are robust to the 
endogeneity of SPII.  
This paper contributes to the learning literature in mergers and acquisitions. Luo 
(2005) and Kau et al. (2008) argue that managers listen to the market in deal completion 
decisions. Different from their studies, I provide evidence that managers learn from the 
market even before a deal is announced. This paper also contributes to the literature that 
SPII is associated with specific corporate decisions. Previous studies find that SPII 
improves internal capital investment efficiencies (Chen et al., 2007; Durnev et al., 2004; 
Wurgler, 2000). My paper, focusing on the external investment – mergers and 
acquisitions, presents evidence that it also improves merger investment decisions.   
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Table I Summary Statistics 
 
The sample includes 2,018 mergers announced from 1990 to 2006. Panel A reports the 
statistics of acquirer SPII. Panel B details the merger investment and three acquirer 
merger performance variables. Panel C states the control variables for firm and deal 
characteristics. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std 
       
Panel A: Information Variables 
Acquirer SPII 2,018 2.26 1.29 2.04 3.01 1.32 
Panel B: Dependent Variables 
Acquirer merger investment 1,997 1.14 0.13 0.39 1.08 2.31 
Acquirer announcement return (%) 2,018 -1.80 -7.54 -1.28 4.47 10.95 
Combined announcement return (%) 2,018 2.64 -3.25 2.59 8.76 11.55 
Post-merger ROA growth (%) 1,987 -4.07 -6.15 -1.13 1.45 16.88 
Panel C: Control Variables 
Acquirer asymmetric information 1,911 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Acquirer firm size ($mil) 2,018 12,015 331 1,423 6,429 31,466 
Acquirer return-on-equity 1,996 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.22 0.43 
Acquirer cash holdings 2,003 0.18 0.03 0.09 0.28 0.21 
Acquirer debt-to-equity 1,997 1.29 0.45 0.98 1.69 1.94 
Acquirer MTB ratio 1,976 4.59 1.92 3.09 5.23 5.67 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q  1,977 2.77 1.42 1.98 3.06 2.41 
Acquirer blockholder ownership 1,972 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.22 0.13 
Target return-on-equity 1,657 -0.05 -0.16 0.07 0.17 0.64 
Target debt-to-equity 1,657 1.52 0.32 0.78 1.77 3.56 
Target Tobin’s Q  1,636 2.32 1.20 1.60 2.58 2.13 
Relative size 2,018 0.44 0.07 0.22 0.62 0.57 
Friendly deal 2,018 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 
Same industry dummy 2,018 0.62 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Tender offer 2,018 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 
Toehold 2,018 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 
Deal completion 2,018 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.32 
Stock payment dummy 2,018 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
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TableII SPII and Merger Investment Sensitivity to Q 
 
This table studies the relation between merger investment and acquirer SPII. Model (1) 
includes the whole sample of 2,018 major merger transactions announced from 1990 to 
2006. Model (2) includes pure cash payment deals. Model (3) includes pure stock 
payment deals. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. p-values are in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Merger Investment 
 
Whole 
Sample 
Cash 
Mergers 
Stock 
Mergers 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
   Intercept 0.31 0.09 0.11 
(0.61) (0.93) (0.94) 
Acquirer Q * acquirer SPII 0.10
***
 0.12
***
 0.11
***
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Acquirer Q  0.00 -0.07 0.01 
(0.91) (0.41) (0.86) 
Acquirer idiosyncratic 
information 
0.02 0.03 -0.06 
(0.76) (0.76) (0.62) 
Acquirer Q * acquirer asymmetric 
information 
5.87
***
 1.30 4.48
***
 
(0.00) (0.57) (0.00) 
Acquirer asymmetric information -1.78 7.47 2.42 
(0.66) (0.34) (0.76) 
    
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,890 469 778 
Adjusted R
2
 0.30 0.28 0.27 
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Table III 
Multivariate Tests of Acquirer Merger Performance and SPII 
 
This table shows how acquirer stock price idiosyncratic information is related with 
acquirer merger performance. The dependent variables in model (1), (2), and (3) are 
acquirer announcement return, combined announcement return, and post-merger ROA 
growth, respectively. There are 2,018 merger transactions during the period from 1990 to 
2006 in models (1) and (2). Model (3) includes 1,785 completed transactions from the 
whole sample. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. p-values are in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Acquirer 
Announcement 
Return 
Combined 
Announcement 
Return 
Post-merger 
ROA Growth 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    Intercept 3.65 7.35 -20.26
*
 
(0.48) (0.20) (0.05) 
Acquirer SPII 0.65
**
 0.71
**
 0.11
**
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 
-5.29 15.88 -26.58 
(0.76) (0.42) (0.41) 
Log of acquirer firm size -0.23 -0.50
**
 0.49 
(0.27) (0.03) (0.18) 
Acquirer return-on-equity 1.29
*
 2.66
***
 
 
(0.06) (0.00) 
 
Acquirer cash holdings -6.85
***
 -7.24
***
 -1.10 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.71) 
Acquirer debt-to-equity -0.01 -0.33
*
 0.47 
(0.92) (0.05) (0.11) 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q 0.02 -0.06 -0.59*** 
(0.88) (0.70) (0.01) 
Relative size -2.23
***
 3.04
***
 -0.25 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.81) 
Target return-on-equity 
 
0.90
*
 
 
 
(0.07) 
 
Target debt-to-equity 
 
-0.08 0.04 
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(0.36) (0.29) 
Target Tobin’s Q 
 
0.18 -1.33
***
 
 
(0.26) (0.00) 
Friendly deal -0.96 -1.83 0.74 
(0.46) (0.20) (0.82) 
Same industry dummy 0.61 0.55 0.45 
(0.27) (0.39) (0.66) 
Tender offer 1.07 0.62 0.52 
(0.13) (0.49) (0.72) 
Toehold 0.52 -0.42 0.91 
(0.68) (0.77) (0.71) 
Deal completion 2.28
**
 3.19
***
 
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
 
Stock payment dummy -2.73
***
 -3.59
***
 -0.10 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.93) 
     
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,875 1,522 1,328 
Adjusted R
2
 0.10 0.14 0.15 
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Table IV Long-run Acquirer Returns and SPII 
 
This table shows the calendar time-based regressions of long-run acquirer returns. In 
1,785 completed merger transactions in my sample, Model 1 includes the acquirers with 
higher-than-median idiosyncratic information, while Model 2 includes the acquirers with 
lower-than-median idiosyncratic information. In Model 3,I include all the completed 
merger transactions but use the dummy variable whether the acquirer has high-than-
median idiosyncratic information. Each month, I form a portfolio consisting of at least 5 
acquirers. An acquirer is included from deal completion until 3 years afterwards. The 
vector of the monthly value-weighted portfolio returns are regressed on the monthly 
factor realizations of the Fama-French (1993) factors.  
  pttptptpftmtppftpt eMOMmHMLhSMBsRRbaRR  ,  
where(Rpt - Rft) is the excess return of the portfolio; (Rmt - Rft) is the excess return of the 
market, SMBt is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return 
on the three big portfolios. HMLt is the average return on the two value portfolios minus 
the average return on the two growth portfolios, and MOMt is the monthly momentum 
factor. The monthly stock returns are from CRSP while the monthly market excess 
returns, SMB, HML, and momentum factors are from the website of Kenneth R. French. 
p-values are in parentheses.
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
Acquirer SPII in the Portfolio High Low 
 
Full Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Intercept 0.99
***
 0.72
***
 0.58
***
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Acquirer high SPII dummy 
  
0.54
**
 
  
(0.04) 
Rm - Rf 0.88
***
 1.02
***
 0.95
***
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SMB 0.12
*
 -0.24
***
 -0.06 
 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.15) 
HML 0.20
**
 -0.41
***
 -0.10
**
 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) 
Number of observations 196 197 393 
Adjusted R
2
 0.58 0.86 0.69 
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Table V 
Multivariate Tests of Acquirer Merger Performance and  
SPII by Acquirer Tobin’s Q 
 
This tablefurtherexaminestheresultsinTable3 that whether the relation between acquirer 
SPII and acquirer merger performance is mainly driven by the subsample when acquirers 
have higher-than-median Tobin’s q. In each pair of regressions that have the same 
dependent variable, I do the regressions in the subsample where the acquirer has higher- 
or lower-than-median Tobin’s q, respectively. The dependent variables in models (1) and 
(2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6) are acquirer announcement return, combined 
announcement return, and post-merger ROA growth, respectively. Models (1), (3), and (5) 
have acquirers with higher Tobin’s q and models (2), (4), and (6) have acquirers with 
lower Tobin’s q. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. p-values are in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
Acquirer 
Announcement 
Return 
Combined 
Announcement Return 
Post-merger 
ROA Growth 
by acquirer Tobin's q High Low High Low High Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      Intercept -8.21 15.04
**
 3.04 13.85
*
 -26.37 -13.29 
(0.29) (0.04) (0.72) (0.10) (0.13) (0.30) 
Acquirer SPII 1.12
***
 0.20 1.11
**
 0.51 1.46
*
 0.79 
(0.01) (0.61) (0.02) (0.27) (0.09) (0.22) 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 
-15.53 -2.06 21.45 10.90 -13.10 -29.09 
(0.51) (0.94) (0.43) (0.73) (0.79) (0.53) 
Log of acquirer firm size 0.04 -0.61
*
 -0.30 -0.49 0.28 0.92
*
 
(0.89) (0.06) (0.38) (0.18) (0.63) (0.08) 
Acquirer return-on-
equity 
1.49 0.39 1.86
*
 3.75
***
   
(0.11) (0.71) (0.08) (0.01)   
Acquirer cash holdings -4.44
**
 -10.01
***
 -5.74
**
 -7.66
**
 -10.26 13.43
***
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Acquirer debt-to-equity -0.13 0.11 -0.52
*
 -0.16 0.61 0.56 
(0.62) (0.56) (0.07) (0.49) (0.23) (0.12) 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q  -0.09 0.12 -0.19 -1.92 -0.35 -5.73*** 
81 
 
(0.58) (0.93) (0.29) (0.20) (0.26) (0.00) 
Relative size -4.27
***
 -1.66
**
 2.26
**
 3.33
***
 -0.11 -0.50 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.96) (0.68) 
Target return-on-equity   1.90
***
 0.18   
  (0.01) (0.81)   
Target debt-to-equity   -0.02 -0.10 0.52
**
 0.16 
  (0.90) (0.37) (0.04) (0.34) 
Target Tobin’s Q    0.39** -0.99** -1.20*** -1.96*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Friendly deal 0.75 -1.77 -0.94 -2.01 -0.06 1.99 
(0.75) (0.27) (0.71) (0.26) (0.99) (0.56) 
Same industry dummy 0.27 0.49 0.93 -0.28 0.42 0.65 
(0.75) (0.52) (0.33) (0.76) (0.81) (0.62) 
Tender offer 1.93
*
 0.72 1.44 -0.06 2.96 -0.67 
(0.09) (0.45) (0.29) (0.96) (0.22) (0.70) 
Toehold 1.47 0.68 0.72 -0.47 3.16 -0.06 
(0.47) (0.69) (0.74) (0.82) (0.42) (0.99) 
Deal completion 0.44 3.23
***
 1.21 3.89
***
   
(0.76) (0.01) (0.43) (0.00)   
Stock payment dummy -1.86
**
 -3.28
***
 -3.38
***
 -3.50
***
 2.65 -2.92
*
 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.04) 
       
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 935 940 760 762 678 650 
Adjusted R
2
 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.15 
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Table VI 
Multivariate Tests of Acquirer Merger Performance and  
SPIIbyBlockholderOwnership 
 
With the same setting with Table 5, this table studies whether the relation between 
acquirer stock price idiosyncratic information and acquirer merger performance is driven 
by the subsample where acquirers have higher-than-median blockholder ownership. The 
dependent variables in models (1) and (2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6) are acquirer 
announcement return, combined announcement return, and post-merger ROA growth, 
respectively. Models (1), (3), and (5) have acquirers with higher blockholder ownership 
and models (2), (4), and (6) have acquirers with lower blockholder ownership. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. p-values are in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Acquirer 
Announcement 
Return 
Combined 
Announcement 
Return 
Post-merger  
ROA Growth 
By acquirer blockholder 
ownership 
High Low High Low High Low 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Intercept 14.17 -1.20 9.42 8.88 -14.13 -13.64 
(0.10) (0.87) (0.32) (0.25) (0.39) (0.33) 
Acquirer SPII 0.97
**
 -0.04 1.10
**
 0.27 1.49
**
 0.45 
(0.02) (0.92) (0.03) (0.55) (0.04) (0.58) 
Acquirer asymmetric 
information 
-9.44 -9.14 57.66
*
 -18.31 1.05 -57.00 
(0.71) (0.72) (0.05) (0.52) (0.98) (0.26) 
Log of acquirer firm size -0.83
**
 -0.03 -0.60 -0.55
*
 0.30 0.20 
(0.02) (0.92) (0.13) (0.08) (0.61) (0.70) 
Acquirer return-on-equity 1.66 1.13 2.04 3.18
***
   
(0.14) (0.22) (0.14) (0.00)   
Acquirer cash holdings -6.24
***
 -7.78
***
 -7.69
***
 -6.95
***
 1.44 -4.65 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.72) (0.29) 
Acquirer debt-to-equity 0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.46
*
 1.60
***
 -0.48 
(0.62) (0.70) (0.81) (0.05) (0.00) (0.26) 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q  0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.03 0.05 -1.07*** 
(0.56) (0.49) (0.63) (0.90) (0.89) (0.00) 
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Relative size -3.65
***
 -0.58 2.29
***
 3.50
***
 -1.50 0.91 
(0.00) (0.51) (0.01) (0.00) (0.28) (0.63) 
Target return-on-equity   0.82 0.70   
  (0.29) (0.33)   
Target debt-to-equity   -0.06 -0.11 0.19 0.15 
  (0.68) (0.37) (0.37) (0.47) 
Target Tobin’s Q    0.08 0.11 -
1.93
***
 
-1.01
***
 
  (0.78) (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) 
Friendly deal -2.67 1.72 -3.16 0.34 0.79 1.22 
(0.15) (0.39) (0.12) (0.87) (0.88) (0.79) 
Same industry dummy -0.39 1.20 -0.36 1.22 0.36 0.40 
(0.62) (0.14) (0.71) (0.19) (0.80) (0.80) 
Tender offer 0.13 2.44
**
 -0.69 2.53
*
 -1.64 3.99
*
 
(0.89) (0.03) (0.58) (0.07) (0.38) (0.09) 
Toehold -0.38 1.46 -0.57 -0.50 0.55 -0.35 
(0.85) (0.39) (0.80) (0.79) (0.89) (0.92) 
Deal completion 3.45
***
 0.32 3.92
***
 0.70   
(0.01) (0.81) (0.01) (0.62)   
Stock payment dummy -3.73
***
 -1.91
**
 -5.28
***
 -2.24
**
 -3.09 2.86
*
 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09) 
     
  
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 924 914 749 745 655 651 
Adjusted R
2
 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.21 
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Table VII Acquirer Merger Performance and SPII 
(other measures of SPII) 
 
This table reports the coefficients on acquirer SPII in regressions as in Table 3 when 
using other measures for the information. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the dependent 
variables are acquirer announcement return, combined announcement return, and post-
merger ROA growth, respectively. In Panel A, I use the non-synchronicity from the 
market model regression, where I control for industry return, Fama-French three factors 
and the momentum factor. In Panel B, the stock price idiosyncratic information is 
measured by (1-R
2
) from the market model regression controlling for industry return. In 
Panel C, the stock price idiosyncratic information is measured by (1-R
2
) from the market 
model regression controlling for industry return, Fama-French three factors and the 
momentum factor. In Panel D, the stock price idiosyncratic information is measured by 
PIN number from Søren Hvidkjaer’s website. In Panel E, the stock price idiosyncratic 
information is measured by the future earnings surprise that cannot be predicted by stock 
returns. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. p-values are in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable 
Acquirer 
Announcement 
Return 
Combined 
Announcement 
Return 
Post-merger ROA 
Growth 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Panel A:    
Non-synchronicity  
(Fama-French factors) 
0.80
**
 0.93
**
 0.32 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.66) 
Number of observations 1,860 1,511 1,313 
Adjusted R
2
 0.10 0.14 0.15 
    
Panel B:    
(1- R2) 
 
1.63 3.84 6.24 
(0.61) (0.28) (0.27) 
Number of observations 1,860 1,511 1,313 
Adjusted R
2
 0.09 0.14 0.15 
    
Panel C:    
(1- R2)  
(Fama-French three 
factors) 
2.36 3.97 4.07 
(0.42) (0.23) (0.43) 
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Number of observations 1,860 1,511 1,313 
Adjusted R
2
 0.09 0.14 0.15 
    
Panel D:    
PIN -3.01 -5.29 0.95 
(0.70) (0.58) (0.92) 
Number of observations 777 602 519 
Adjusted R
2
 0.14 0.23 0.18 
    
Panel E:    
Accounting measure of 
stock price idiosyncratic 
information 
-8.14 -21.90
**
 -13.43 
(0.35) (0.03) (0.38) 
Number of observations 1,679 1,362 1,198 
Adjusted R
2
 0.10 0.15 0.16 
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Table VIII 2SLS Regressions of Merger Performanceand Acquirer SPII 
 
This table shows the 2SLS regression results where I control for the endogeneity of SPII. 
In the first step, the dependent variable is acquirer SPII. In the second step, I use the 
residual from the first step as the main independent variable. The dependent variables in 
models (1), (2), and (3) are acquirer announcement return, combined announcement 
return, and post-merger ROA growth, respectively. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at 1% and 99%. All variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
1st Step Regression Acquirer SPII 
 
 
Intercept 7.70
***
 
(0.00) 
Acquirer firm age -0.14
***
 
 (0.00) 
Acquirer high-tech dummy -0.55
***
 
(0.01) 
Number of observations 2,018 
Adjusted R
2
 0.06 
2nd Step Regression 
Acquirer 
Announcement 
Return 
Combined 
Announcement 
Return 
Post-merger 
ROA Growth 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
   
Intercept 9.85
**
 15.40
***
 0.17 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.83) 
Residual from the 1st step 0.60
**
 0.66
**
 0.88
*
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Control variables as in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,836 1,490 1,321 
p-value of chi-square test <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions in Chapter I 
 
 
 
 
Acquirer (Target) firm size equals firm market value 21 days before the deal 
announcement.  
Acquirer advisor retention equals one if an acquirer uses the same advisor in a future 
merger within three years after the completion of the current deal, and zero otherwise. If 
the acquirer hires more than one advisor, the advisor retention variable equals one if any 
of these advisors are retained.  
Acquirer advisors’ future reputation is reputation rank one year before a future deal 
based on Thomson Financial Top 25 investment bank rankings of aggregate advised 
merger value (one represents the highest reputation).  Advisory banks not included in the 
top 25 are assigned a rank of 26.  
Acquirer announcement return equals acquirer stock cumulative return during days [-
20, +1], where day 0 is the deal announcement day, minus the CRSP value weighted 
index return during the same period.  
Acquirer industry-adjusted ROA equals acquirer ROA less industry median ROA in the 
last fiscal year before deal announcement (industry classification follows Fama and 
French, 1997).  
Acquirer institutional cross-holding returns are calculated for each institution that holds 
both target and acquirer stocks. We calculate the combined return from each institution’s 
holdings during the window of [-20, +1] days around the deal announcement and average 
the combined returns across institutions using its stock holding in the acquirer stock as 
weights.   
Affiliated analysts work for the same investment bank as financial advisors. We compare 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations 3 years pre-announcement with those afterwards 
until shareholder voting (post-announcement). Affiliated analysts initiate if they provide 
post-announcement recommendations only; upgrade/downgrade if post-announcement 
recommendations are better/worse than those pre-announcement, respectively; keep the 
same recommendation if post-announcement recommendations are the same as those 
pre-announcement or if they provide no post-announcement recommendations but issue 
post-announcement EPS forecasts; drop coverage if analysts provide pre-announcement 
recommendations but no post-announcement recommendation.  
Affiliated analysts provide recommendations equals one if analysts provide 
recommendations after the merger announcement, and zero otherwise.  
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Affiliated analysts improve recommendations equals one if analysts initiate, upgrade, or 
keep the same recommendations after the merger announcement, and zero if analysts 
downgrade or drop recommendations.  
Rankings of affiliated analysts’ recommendations equals one, two, three, four, and five 
if analysts initiate, upgrade, keep the same, downgrade, and drop recommendations, 
respectively.  
Acquirer shareholder approval rate equals (F – M – I) / (N - M - I), where F is the 
number of "for" votes cast for a merger, M is the voting rights held by management, I is 
the voting rights held by affiliated institutional investors, and N is the total number of 
voting rights outstanding.  
Management voting rights equals M / N, where M is the number of votes owned by 
management and N is the total number of voting rights outstanding.  
Advisor-affiliated institutional voting rights equals I / N, where I is the number of voting 
rights owned by institutions affiliated with merger advisors one quarter pre-merger 
announcement and N is the total number of voting rights outstanding.  
Deal value is the total value paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses.  
Financial advisors provide earnings per share (EPS) forecasts equals one if financial 
advisors issue forecasts for EPS for an acquirer post-merger, and zero otherwise.  
EPS forecasts are classified into 3 categories: accretion, neutral, and dilution depending 
on whether post-merger earnings are estimated higher, the same, or lower than stand-
alone earnings, respectively.  
Financial advisors provide non-dilutive EPS forecasts equals one if advisors provide 
accretive or neutral EPS forecasts, and zero otherwise.  
Rankings of financial advisors’ EPS forecasts equals negative one when advisors do not 
provide EPS forecasts, equals zero when advisors provide dilutive EPS forecasts, and 
equals one when advisors provide non-dilutive EPS forecasts.  
Financial advisors provide equity value (EV) estimations equals one if financial 
advisors provide target equity value estimations, and zero otherwise.   
Financial advisors’ EV estimations measured by EV ratios, equal the scaled difference 
between the average target equity valuation and the offer price.  
Rankings of financial advisors’ EV estimations equals negative one if advisors do not 
provide EV estimations,  equals zero if EV ratios are negative, and equals one if EV 
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ratios are positive or zero.  
Relative size equals transaction value divided by acquirer market value 21 days before 
the merger announcement.  
Same industry indicator equals one if the acquirer and target firms are in same industry 
(classified in Fama and French, 1997), and zero otherwise.  
Stock payment equals one if a deal is paid with stock only, and zero otherwise.  
Toehold equals percentage of target shares held by the acquirer at deal announcement.  
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Appendix B: Example of Financial Advisors’ Opinions  
 
 
 
 
The following paragraphs come from the joint proxy statement issued by New York Community 
Bancorp (acquirer) and Roslyn Bancorp (target). This proxy statement was officially filed with 
the SEC on September 23, 2003, and delivered to both firms' shareholders on September 25, 
2003. Citigroup Global Markets was the financial advisor for New York Community while 
Goldman Sachs and Sandler O’Neill were the financial advisors for Roslyn Bancorp.  
Opinion of Citigroup Global Markets Inc. to New York Community  
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. was retained to act as financial advisor to New York Community 
in connection with a potential combination transaction with Roslyn. Pursuant to Citigroup Global 
Markets’ letter agreement with New York Community, dated May 30, 2003, Citigroup Global 
Markets rendered an opinion to the New York Community board of directors on June 26, 2003, to 
the effect that, based upon and subject to the considerations and limitations set forth in the 
opinion, Citigroup Global Markets’ work described below and other factors it deemed relevant, as 
of that date, the exchange ratio in the proposed merger was fair, from a financial point of view, to 
New York Community. …..  
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis.   Citigroup Global Markets performed a discounted cash flow 
analysis to estimate a range for the implied equity value per share of Roslyn common stock as of 
June 25, 2003, including certain potential expenses and cost savings forecasted by management to 
result from the merger. Citigroup Global Markets performed this analysis both including and 
excluding the potential impact on Roslyn’s forecasted earnings of the $3.5 billion downsizing of 
Roslyn’s securities portfolio expected by management to be effected following the merger. In this 
analysis, Citigroup Global Markets assumed a weighted average cost of capital of 10.6% and used 
a range of 8.5% to 12.5% to derive the present values of (1) Roslyn’s estimated free cash flows 
available to stockholders from 2004 to 2008, plus (2) Roslyn’s terminal value at the end of 2008. 
Terminal values for Roslyn were calculated based on a range of 9.0x to 12.0x estimated 2009 
EPS. In performing this analysis, Citigroup Global Markets used IBES estimates of EPS as of 
June 25, 2003 for Roslyn and an estimated long-term annual growth rate for Roslyn’s EPS (also 
obtained from IBES) of 9.0%. EPS data were adjusted to account for certain restructuring charges 
anticipated by management to result from the merger and management’s assumptions of cost 
savings resulting from the merger of 35% of Roslyn’s pre-tax controllable overhead expense, 
with an annual growth rate of such cost savings of 3% per year after 2004. In determining cash 
flows available to stockholders, Citigroup Global Markets used forecasted dividend payout ratios 
(in other words, percentages of adjusted EPS payable to stockholders), which assume the 
maintenance of a constant ratio of tangible common equity to tangible assets of 5.0% and an asset 
growth rate of 10% per annum. The results of these analyses are set forth below:  
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Based on these results, Citigroup Global Markets derived a reference range for the implied equity 
value per share of Roslyn common stock without taking into account the potential impact of the 
expected downsizing of Roslyn’s securities portfolio and also derived a reference range for the 
implied equity value per share of Roslyn common stock taking the potential impact of the 
expected downsizing into account. Citigroup Global Markets noted that the implied value per 
share of Roslyn common stock of $20.86 based on the exchange ratio in the merger and the 
closing price of New York Community common stock on June 25, 2003 and the implied value 
per share of Roslyn common stock of $20.33 based on the exchange ratio in the merger and the 
closing price of New York Community common stock on June 26, 2003 were below both 
reference ranges for the implied equity value per share of Roslyn common stock derived by 
Citigroup Global Markets in its discounted cash flow analysis. The following table summarizes 
the results of these analyses: 
 
 
 
Forecasted Pro Forma Financial Analysis. Citigroup Global Markets analyzed the estimated 
financial impact of the merger on New York Community’s 2004 and 2005 estimated EPS and 
2004 and 2005 estimated cash EPS (“CEPS”). CEPS is determined by adding per share 
amortization of acquisition-related intangible assets to EPS. In the course of this analysis, 
Citigroup Global Markets used IBES estimates of EPS for 2004 and 2005, utilizing the IBES 
forecasted long-term EPS growth rate of 13.5%, and assumed, based on management forecasts, 
that the merger will result in cost savings equal to 35% of Roslyn’s pre-tax controllable overhead 
expense. Based on its analysis, Citigroup Global Markets determined that the merger would be 
accretive to New York Community’s estimated EPS and estimated CEPS for 2004 and 2005 and 
noted that the tangible common ratio would improve to surpass pre-transaction levels during that 
period…… 
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions in Chapter II 
 
 
 
 
Accounting measure of stock price idiosyncratic information equals the residual from 
the regression    
 
 ttttt urcEbEbar 0 , where tr  is the annual stock 
return during the last fiscal year before deal announcement,  tE  is the earnings per 
share change   periods ahead scaled by the price at the beginning of the fiscal year t, and 
 is from one to three. The coefficients are estimated for each industry defined by the 3-
digit SIC codes.  
 
Acquirer (Target) debt-to-equity is acquirer (target) firm debt divided by equity in the 
prior fiscal year before deal announcement (COMPUSTAT items data9/data60).  
Acquirer (Target) return-on-equity equals acquirer (target) firm earnings divided by 
average equity in the prior fiscal year before deal announcement (COMPUSTAT items 
2*data20/(data60+data60 (t – 1)).  
Acquirer (Target) Tobin’s Q is market value of equity plus book value of assets minus 
book value of equity, scaled by book value of assets, all measured at the end of the fiscal 
year before deal announcement (COMPUSTAT items (data24*data25+data6-
data60)/data6).  
Acquirer announcement returnequals acquirer accumulated abnormal return over (-1, 
+7) around deal announcement; I use market value-weighted return as the benchmark.  
Acquirer asymmetric information is the average of absolute abnormal return (-1, +1) at 
around the previous four quarterly earnings announcements before the deal 
announcement. 
Acquirer blockholder ownership is acquirer blockholder ownership one quarter before 
deal announcement. I define institutional investors as blockholders if their ownership is 
higher than 5%.  
Acquirer cash holdings equals acquirer cash holdings divided by total value of assets 
(COMPUSTAT items data1/data6).  
Acquirer firm age equals the log of the number of days the firm listed on the stock 
market. 
Acquirer firm size ($mil) is acquirer equity capitalization two days before deal 
announcement.  
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Acquirer high-tech dummy equals one if the acquirer has the 3-digit SIC code of 357, 
366, 367, 381, 382, 384, 481, 489, or 737; otherwise, it equals zero. 
Acquirer SPII equals log [(1-R
2
)/R
2
], where R
2
 is from the market model regression 
controlling for industry value-weighted return. It is calculated based on daily returns 
during (-295, -43) before deal announcement. I require that there are at least 100 return 
observations. I define industry by 3-digit SIC codes. 
Acquirer merger investment equals deal value from SDC scaled by the acquirer book 
value of assets in the prior fiscal year of the merger announcement. 
Acquirer MTB ratio equals acquirer market value of common stock divided by book 
value of equity in the prior fiscal year before deal announcement (COMPUSTAT items 
data24*data25/data60). 
Combined announcement return is the value-weighted acquirer announcement return 
and target announcement return, where acquirer announcement return is the accumulated 
abnormal return over (-1, +7) around deal announcement and target announcement return 
is the accumulated abnormal return over (-43, +7) around deal announcement. The 
weights are acquirer and target firms' equity capitalization at two and 44 days before deal 
announcement, respectively.  
Deal completion equals one if the deal is completed as indicated in SDC; otherwise, zero.  
Friendly deal equals one if the attitude field in SDC is not marked ‘‘unsolicited’’ or 
‘‘hostile’’; otherwise, zero.  
Merger serial dummy equals one if the acquirer announced mergers within one year 
before the deal announcement; otherwise, zero. 
PIN is the from SørenHvidkjaer’s website. It measures the probability of informed 
trading.  
Post-merger ROA growth is the ROA change after the merger. I use value-weighted 
ROA of merging firms before the merger as the original ROA, using pre-merger total 
assets as the weight (for completed deals only).  
Relative size is deal value divided by acquirer equity capitalization two days before deal 
announcement.  
Same industry dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target are in the same industry 
according to 2-digit SIC codes; otherwise, zero.  
Stock payment dummy equals one if the deal is paid only with stock; otherwise, zero.  
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Target firm size ($mil) is target equity capitalization 44 days before deal announcement.  
Tender offer equals one if the bid involves a tender offer as recorded in SDC; otherwise, 
zero. 
Toehold equals one if the fraction of the target’s common stock owned by the bidder is 
greater than 5% at merger announcement date; otherwise, zero.  
 
  
102 
 
VITA 
WenjingOuyang 
 
EDUCATION 
Ph.D. in Finance, Drexel University (2012) 
M.S. in Finance, Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade, China (2004) 
B.S. in Finance, Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade, China (2001) 
 
RESEARCH                                                                                                                                                 
 Merger Investment and Stock Price Idiosyncratic Information (with Samuel Szewczyk)* 
Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual Meeting, Denver, 2011 
Southern Finance Association (SFA) Annual Meeting, Key West, 2011 
Financial Management Association (FMA) Doctoral Student Consortium, New York, 2010 
*: previous version is under the name “Acquirer Return and Investor Private Information” 
 Do Shareholders Listen? M&A Advisor Opinions and Shareholder Voting (with David 
Becher and JayCai) 
Financial Intermediation Research Society (FIRS) Conference, Sydney, 2011 
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